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Money is one of the most important elements in the modern economy, but it has a
critical disadvantage; it is vulnerable to ination and ination uncertainty, mainly
due to unstable monetary policies or market psychology (sunspots). The main
focus of this dissertation is to investigate the impact of nancial innovation or
scal policies on welfare and asset prices when the economy is contaminated by
ination volatility. This dissertation consists of four essays.
The rst essay investigates an economy with incomplete nancial markets as
described by Cass (1989), where there is typically a continuum of equilibria driven
by sunspots. In this essay, I dene price volatility in a natural way and take it as
a parameter of a derived economy. I show that for each level of price volatility,
there is a unique regular sunspot-economy. Typically, there is no Pareto ranking
among the di¤erent sunspot economies. However, I consider a compensation test
based on balanced lump-sum tax-transfer plans that are implemented in period 0
and denominated in money or commodities. This test reveals that lower volatility
economies are generically Kaldor-Hicks superior to higher volatility economies. The
ndings imply that Kaldor-Hicks e¢ ciency is achieved through sunspot-stabilizing
policies.
The second essay introduces a sunspots-economy where both money and
ination-indexed bond markets are active. The model of the economy is exactly
the same as Cass(1989) GEI model with the addition of the indexed bonds. Mas-
Colell (1992) and Goenka and Prechac (2006) have shown that nancial markets
can be immune to sunspots by introducing real securities such as ination-indexed
bonds. However, the introduction of these real securities results in a complete
shutdown of nominal nancial markets. To resolve this unrealistic outcome, I as-
sume that a transaction cost in intermediating indexed bonds exists. This paper
shows that the market for money is always active with the transaction costs of
indexed bonds. I also show that these bonds have a greater opportunity to be
actively traded as the market has higher ination volatility.
The third essay introduces a two-period monetary general equilibrium model
with proportional transaction costs on nominal and ination-indexed bonds. The
main focus of this essay is to investigate the impact of introducing ination-indexed
bonds on nominal interest rates and the welfare of savers and borrowers. I demon-
strate that this nancial innovation on indexed bonds causes equilibrium interest
rates of nominal securities to increase when agents have precautionary saving mo-
tives. This result implies that ignoring precautionary motives would underestimate
saverswelfare gain and overestimates borrowerswelfare gain from innovation on
indexed bonds. I show the main results of this paper by incorporating nancial
transaction costs and unstable monetary policies in the GE model and provide the
rigorous proofs for existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium. I also provide the
comparative statics of bond trading volume with respect to asymmetric transaction
costs.
A static economy in which nominal taxes and transfers are balanced, as pro-
posed by Balasko and Shell (1993), typically has a continuum of equilibrium money
prices. The fourth essay presents a constructive example in which the set of equi-
librium money prices is not connected. By allowing negative consumption as a
mathematical construct, closed form solutions for equilibrium tax-adjusted income
are derived.
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CHAPTER 1
PRICE LEVEL VOLATILITY AND INCOMPLETE MARKETS
WITH SUNSPOTS
1.1 Introduction
Sunspots provide explanations of excess volatility of both price levels and alloca-
tions.1 Cass (1989) shows that when markets are incomplete, there is typically a
continuum of sunspot equilibria. This paper shows that in the Cass GEI model,
a unique regular economy exists for each given measure of price-level volatility.
Although each equilibrium exhibits di¤erent levels of ex-post price volatility, the
equilibria in a given economy are not, in general, Pareto-ordered by price volatility
levels.2 Therefore, this paper also addresses the following questions: 1) Is there a
sensible welfare ranking that allows for comparisons among equilibria from di¤er-
ent price-level volatilities? 2) If so, what would be the policy implications of this
nding?
For question 1, I o¤er a compensation test based on balanced lump-sum taxes
and transfers (balanced tax-transfer plans) that are implemented in period 0 and
denominated by commodities or money.3 This paper compares any two regular
economies with the same economic fundamentals but with di¤erent price volatili-
ties. Specically, it demonstrates that there are balanced lump-sum tax plans that
This essay was presented at the Cornell-Penn State Macroeconomics Conference in Spring
2012.
1See Cass and Shell (1983) and Shell (1987, 2008).
2Goenka and Préchac (2006) and Kajii (2007) show that sunspot equilibria are not, in general,
Pareto dominated by non-sunspot equilibria in incomplete nancial markets
3Whether the taxes and transfers are denominated by commodity or money, the main results of
this paper are invariant: if there exist welfare-improving commodity tax plans from one economy
to another, there also exist money tax plans, and vice versa.
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would allow an economy with lower volatility to be Pareto superior to one with
higher volatility. In other words, a lower volatility economy is Kaldor-Hicks supe-
rior to a higher volatility economy with a compensation test based on the proposed
tax plans.45
These ndings have important policy implications. Several studies have sug-
gested stabilizing policies to eliminate the e¤ects of sunspots on incomplete mar-
kets. Four dominant policies have been proven: a) the introduction of new types
of nominal securities6, b) the introduction of as many real securities as the num-
ber of goods in each state7, c) the indexation of nominal bonds in terms of price
levels8 and d) the introduction of options.9 These policies immunize the econ-
omy from sunspot e¤ects; consequently, the outcomes of the equilibria are Pareto
e¢ cient. However, e¢ ciency does not imply that all consumers are better o¤.
Recent sunspot literature has shown that many consumers can actually benet
from sunspots.10 This means that the government can fail to gain consensus in
adopting stabilizing policies. However, if balanced lump-sum tax plans are allowed,
consumer consensus on sunspot-stabilizing policies can be achieved. Simply stated,
Kaldor-Hicks e¢ ciency is reached through sunspot-stabilizing policies.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, I introduce
the general setting of the model. Section 3 presents the main results in Cass
4On the other hand, there are no existing plans that improve welfare in an economy with high
volatility relative to one with low volatility. Therefore, the Kaldor-Hicks criterion in this paper
satises both completeness and transitivity
5The concept that economy Ais Kaldor-Hicks superior to economy Bin this paper means
that there are balanced lump-sum tax plans which make the allocations in economy APareto
superior to those in economy B. If A is Pareto superior to B, A is also Kaldor-Hicks
superior to B. But the reverse is not necessarily true. See Kaldor (1939) and Hicks (1939).
6See Cass and Shell (1983) [Proposition 3] and Balasko (1983) [Theorem 1]
7See Mas-Colell (1992)
8See Goenka and Préchac (2006)
9See Antinol and Keister(1998) and Kajii(1997).
10See Bhattacharya, Guzman and Shell (1998), Goenka and Préchac (2006), Kajii (2007) and
Cozzi, Goenka and Shell (2012).
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(1989) and then show that a regular economy can be dened within the model.
In Section 4, I dene a measure of price-level volatility that is invariant to the
choice of a numeraire price and a nominal interest rate. Given this measure, the
main result of this paperthe existence of welfare improving tax plans from a low
volatility economy to a high volatility oneis introduced in Section 5. The proof
of the result in Section 5 is shown in Section 6. Finally, concluding remarks are
presented in Section 7.
1.2 Model
There are two periods, today and tomorrow, labelled by the superscripts t = 0; 1.
At date 1, there are two states, s = ;  having positive probabilities 0 <  < 1
and  = 1  ; respectively. There are H consumers, labelled by the subscripts
h 2 H = f1; 2; :::; Hg.11
Consumer hs consumption allocation is xh =

x0h; x
1
h ; x
1
h

2 X = R3++ corre-
sponding to price p =
 
p0; p1; p1
 0: His endowment is eh = e0h; e1h ; e1h  2 X
where e1h = e
1
h = e
1
h: Denote by U the space of C2 utility functions on R2++ which
are twice di¤erentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave. This also has the
closure of indi¤erence curves contained in R2++ and satises the von Neumann-
Morgenstern expected utility hypothesis. Denote by A the set of characteristics
(vh; eh) 2 U X. Consumer hs preferences are
uh(xh) = uh

x0h; x
1
h ; x
1
h

= vh
 
x0h; x
1
h

+ vh

x0h; x
1
h

Throughout the paper, I assume that there is an incentive for at least two of the
11There are two di¤erences between Casss model and the model here: (1) Cass allows only
two households but the model here allows many households, and (2) Cass distinguishes the asset
return in the -state with that in  state and denoted them as r and r .
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consumers to trade, i.e., for h; h0 2 H;
@vh (e
0
h; e
1
h)
@x1
=
@vh (e
0
h; e
1
h)
@x0
6= @vh0 (e
0
h0 ; e
1
h0)
@x1
=
@vh0 (e
0
h0 ; e
1
h0)
@x0
This condition implies that the initial endowment is not Pareto e¢ cient.
In a monetary market, there is only one nancial instrument (money). mh
denotes consumer hs money holdings. An economic fundamental E is simply a
list (uh; eh) 2 A, h 2 H. Denote the space of economic fundamentals by M
where M =Qh2H A. The monetary equilibrium is dened as follows: there are
some positive spot prices p 0 and associated money holdings m such that each
household chooses (xh;mh) in the optimization problem, denoted as (PA).
maxuh

x0h; x
1
h ; x
1
h

subject to
8>>>><>>>>:
p0x0h +mh  p0e0h
p1x1h  p1e1h +mh
p1x1h  p1e1h +mh
(PA)
and xh 2 X
each market clears, P
h x
0
h =
P
h e
0
h;P
h x
1
h =
P
h x
1
h =
P
h ehP
hmh = 0:
1.3 Equilibrium
Several authors have demonstrated that in a general model of sunspots with in-
complete markets, the set of equilibrium allocations takes on a continuum.12 The
12See Cass (1989, 1991, 1992) and Siconol (1991). Manuelli and Peck (1992) show that in
overlapping generation model with incomplete markets, a continuum of sunspot equilibria can
4
economy has only one asset (money) but two sunspots states,  and , at date 1.
Therefore, the equilibrium set has one degree of real indeterminacy. This suggests
that by adding one relevantadditional equation into the system of equations for
the optimal solution, we can obtain a unique or nitely many equilibria.13 Cass
(1989) chooses the most relevantequation as the ratio of two real returns and
shows that a nite number of equilibria exist for any given ratio of the two real
returns. The two real returns, denoted as
 
R; R

in the monetary economy, are
given as  
R; R

=

1
p1
;
1
p1

:
The ratio of two real returns, equivalent to the ratio of two prices p1 and p1,
determines the ratio between excess demand in each state: x1   e1 and x1   e1.
The relationship is derived from budget constraint at date 1:8><>: p
1x1h = p
1e1 +mh
p1x1h = p
1e1 +mh
) x
1
h   e1
x1h   e1
=
p1
p1
:
Figure 1.1(a) represents the excess-demand domains of both lenders and bor-
rowers. The gure should be three-dimensional including the excess demand of
x0; but we can imagine that the three-dimensional gure is projected onto a two-
dimensional space. Once the return-line is determined, there will be a unique or
nitely many equilibria point(s) for both the lender (mh > 0) and the borrower
(mh < 0) on the line.14 The lenders allocation point is located in the northeast
area while the borrowers point is in the southwest area. By market clearing, the
two points are symmetric to (0; 0) assuming that there are only two consumers
(H = 2) in the economy.
be interpreted as the limiting case of economies overreacting to small shocks to fundamentals.
13One requirement is that the gradient of the relevantequation must be linearly independent
from those of the system of equations at the equilibrium prices or allocations.
14In the monetary market, the asset buyer and seller can be translated into the money lender
and the money borrower, respectively.
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Figure 1.1: Real return lines
A relative price between p1 and p1 is dened as
P = p
1
p1
(1.1)
where P > 1, so we can say that relative to state  (no sunspots), state  is
inationary.15 There is no price-level volatility if P = 1. For each xed level of a
relative price, there is the corresponding unique return-line shown in Figure 1.1.
This paper later proves that a unique or nitely many equilibria exist given each
ratio of a relative price. Simply stated, the economy given P 2 (0;1) is regular
and determinate. For the convenience of proofs and better intuition, I dene the
equivalent maximization problem in Denition 1. I label the original maximization
problem as (PA) and the equivalent problem as (PB). The equivalent maximization
problem (PB) is given as
Denition 1.1 Given (q0; q), consumer hs equivalent maximization problem (PB)
is dened as
maxUh(z
0
h; Bh)
subject to q0z0h + qBh  0 (PB)
15See Bhattacharya, Guzman and Shell (1998)
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where
R
R
=
1
P :
where
Uh(z
0
h; Bh) = uh(e
0
h + z
0
h; e
1
h +R
Bh; e
1
h +R
Bh)
The following lemma shows that for the given relative price P 2 R++, (PB) is
equivalent to (PA).
Lemma 1.1 Given P = p1=p1, (PA) and (PB) are equivalent where
x0h = e
0
h + z
0
h; x
1
h = e
1
h +R
Bh; x
1
h = e
1
h +R
Bh
mh = qBh; p
1 =
q
R
and p1 =
q
R
Proof. The argument simply involves comparing rst-order conditions for the
two problems. Applying the Kuhn-Tucker theorem for concave programming, the
following necessary and su¢ cient conditions can be derived. The Lagrangian of
(PA) is given by
LPA = uh (xh) + 
0
h
 
p0e0h   p0x0h  mh

+1h
 
p1e1h   p1x1h +mh

+ 1h

p1e1h   p1x1h +mh

The system of equations from the rst-order conditions, budget constraints, and
relative price are
@uh(xh)
@x0h
= 0hp
0
@vh(x0h;x1sh )
@x1sh
= 1sh
p1s
s
for s = ; 
1h + 
1
h

= 0h
) 
p1
@vh(x0h;x1h )
@x1h
+ 

p1
@vh(xh;x1h )
@x1h
= 0h

 p0 (x0h   e0h) = mh
p1s (x1sh   e1h) = mh for s = ; :
p1 = Pp1:
9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
(1.2)
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The Lagrangian of (PB) is given by
LPB = uh(e
0
h + z
0
h; e
1
h +R
Bh; e
1
h +R
Bh)  h
 
q0z0h + qBh

:
The system of equations from the rst-order conditions and the budget constraints
are
@uh(xh)
@z0h

= @uh(xh)
@x0h

= hq
0

@vh(e0h+z0h;e1h+RBh)
@Bh
+ 
@vh(e0h+z0h;e1h+RBh)
@Bh
= hq
) R @vh(e
0
h+z
0
h;e
1
h+R
Bh)
@x1h
+ R
@vh(e0h+z0h;e1h+RBh)
@x1h
= hq

q0z0h + qBh = 0
R
R
= 1P
9>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>;
(1.3)
Finally, we need to show that the two systems of equations (1.2) and (1.3) are
equivalent when choosing
p0 = q0; 0h = h;
p1s =
q
Rs
for s = ; 
1sh = 
sh for s = ; 
x0h = e
0
h + z
0
h; x
1
h = e
1
h +R
Bh; x
1
h = e
1
h +R
Bh; mh = qBh;
and
p1
p1
=
R
R
=
1
P :
In the equivalent problem, R =
 
R; R

is a function of P and the mean E [R]
is xed as a constant. The mean of R does not a¤ect equilibrium allocations. Only
the relative price P matters in equilibrium allocations. From Lemma 1, we can
prove the following proposition.
Proposition 1.1 There is a generic set of fundamentalsM M on which any
economy, specied by a pair (P ; E) 2 R++ M, is regular.
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Proof. In the equivalent maximization problem, the utility function is given by
Uh
 
z0h; Bh

= vh(e
0
h + z
0
h; e
1
h +R
Bh) + 
vh(e
0
h + z
0
h; e
1
h +R
Bh):
We can prove that Uh (z0h; Bh) is continuous, strictly quasi-concave and strictly
increasing in (z0h; Bh). The three properties of Uh are trivially inherited from
vh. Note that this has now become a conventional equilibrium problem with two
commodities. Therefore, the economy is regular and determinate generically in
M.
Remark 1.1 Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986) proved the existence and reg-
ularity of the conventional 2-period model with real assets based on Debreu (1970).
We can also use their proof directly in our case.
The next step is to compare the two economies with di¤erent levels of relative
prices but still with the same economic fundamentals. Figure 1.1(b) shows the
relationship between relative prices and their corresponding return-lines. It is clear
that as the economy has higher relative prices where P  1, the return-line will
deviate more from the 45 degree line. This implies that all households, including
both lenders and borrowers, will feel more risk averse in a higher relative price P
where P  1.
1.4 Price Level Volatility
Let  = (ep1)=E(ep1), where (ep1) and E(ep1) are respectively the standard devia-
tion and the mean of prices. The measure is invariant to scaling changes in spot
9
prices, which can be caused by the choice of the numeraire. Simply stated,  is not
a¤ected by scaling changes in (p1; p1); it depends only on the ratio (p1=p1).16
Thus,  is well-dened:
 =
(ep1)
E(ep1)  0 (1.4)
If  = 0, the economy is a non-sunspot economy (equivalent to certainty economy),
but it is a proper sunspot economy if  > 0.
Now, we can construct a direct relationship between price-level volatility and
its corresponding derived regular economy.
Corollary 1.1 There is a generic set of fundamentals M  M on which any
economy, specied by a pair (; E) 2 R+ M, is regular.
Proof. Price-level volatility  is given by
 =
(ep1)
E(ep1) =
p

p1   p1
p1 + p1
=
p
 j1  Pj
 + P :
Volatility  is strictly increasing in P  1. As P ! 1, (ep1)=E(ep1)!q

. By
Proposition 1, it is clear that there is a corresponding regular economy to each
level of volatility .
1.5 Welfare-improving lump-sum tax plans: the Compen-
sation test
The purpose of this section is to introduce a reasonable way to compare
economies with di¤erent levels of price volatility. A simple and direct way might
16It is assumed that p1  p1 throughout this paper.
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be to check for the Pareto superiority of the equilibria from comparable markets.
One might conjecture that an economy with lower price volatility always admits
Pareto superior equilibria compared to an economy with higher price volatility,
given the same economic fundamentals. The answer can be true if the value of
money is invariant in the changes of market beliefs (price-level volatility). How-
ever, the value of money is not generally the same for two di¤erent market beliefs
even if both economies have the same economic fundamentals. Several papers
have shown that allocations from a non-sunspot economy are not Pareto superior
to those from a sunspot economy even though the former is Pareto e¢ cient and
the latter is not.17 However, this paper shows the existence of complete welfare
ranking among equilibria with di¤erent levels of price volatility by introducing a
compensation test based on balanced lump-sum tax plans. The space of balanced
lump-sum tax plans is dened as
T =

( 1; :::; H) 2 RH j
P
h2H h = 0
	
:
A set of welfare-improving tax plans is dened below.
Denition 1.2 (A; E) is Kaldor-Hicks superior to (B; E), i.e.,
(A; E) KH (B; E);
17One simple example in Goenka and Préchac (2006) is the case where there are two consumers
who have the same expected utility functions v1 = v2 = log(x0)+log(x1) and whose endowments
are e1 = (1; 0) and e2 = (0; 1). In this case, as the price-level volatility increases, the second
consumers utility value increases. The intuition is as follows: For a high level of price volatility,
the real return of assets becomes very small in an ination state. If the ination state is real-
ized, the rst consumer will end up getting a very small amount of the second-period good and
consequently her utility will be considerably damaged. Therefore, the rst consumers demand
for the asset will be higher to protect the ination state against the low return in a higher level
of price volatility. The high demand of the rst consumer results in a high price (value) of the
asset. Finally, the second consumer, who sells the asset to the rst one, obtains more income as
the asset price goes higher. This positive income e¤ect for the second consumer outweighs the
negative risk e¤ects from the high level of price volatility. (See the Appendix for more details
about the example.)
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if there exist(s)  2 T such that the economy (A; E) with the tax-transfer plan 
is Pareto superior to the economy (B; E):
The tax-transfer plan  is applied to the economy (A; E). Then, the budget
constraints at date 0 is modied to be
p0x0h +mh  p0e0h   h h = 1; :::; H : (1.5)
The budget constraints in the second period are invariant. Assuming that p0 = 1,
we can interpret that the taxes and transfers are denominated by the rst-period
commodities.
The following is the main result of this paper.
Proposition 1.2 Generically inM, if E 2 M and A < B,
(A; E) KH (B; E)
and
(B; E) KH (A; E):
Proof. See Section 6.
The proposition is proven in the next section. This proposition implies that
an economy with lower volatility is superior in a welfare sense to one with higher
volatility, since (1) there exists a balanced tax plan which allows the former to
be superior to the latter, and (2) at the same time, there does not exist such
a plan in the other way around. In other words, a lower volatility economy is
Kaldor-Hicks superior to a higher volatility economy with a compensation test
based on balanced tax plans. The Kaldor-Hicks criterion in this paper satises
both completeness and transitivity.
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Even though the proof is not mathematically trivial, the intuition is simple. Al-
though each consumer experiences di¤erent wealth changes driven by price volatil-
ity changes (price ratio changes), the aggregate wealth changes equal zero by mar-
ket clear conditions. Therefore, a social planner can always nd lump-sum tax
plans which eliminate the wealth e¤ects from one price volatility level to another
level. With these tax plans, only the direct risk e¤ect (the risk e¤ect from the
deviation of the asset-return line depicted in Figure ??) will matter in consumers
utility values. (See Section 6 for more details.)
The results of Proposition 2 also make it possible to compare sunspot equi-
libria ( > 0) and non-sunspot (or certainty) equilibria ( = 0). Where sunspot
equilibria are not Pareto dominated by certainty equilibria, the government can
easily fail to arrive at a consensus in sunspot-stabilizing policies. The following
corollary guarantees that there are welfare-improving tax plans from a sunspot to
a non-sunspot economy, thus allowing for consensus of sunspot-stabilizing policies:
Corollary 1.2 Generically inM, if E 2 M,
(E ; 0) KH (E ; ) if  > 0
Proof. Trivial from Proposition 2.
1.6 Wealth Analysis
In this section, I investigate how utility levels respond to the changes of market
beliefs. Market beliefs in price levels are associated with utility levels in two
di¤erent ways. First, an increase in the relative price (assuming that P  1) can
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cause all of the agents to feel more risk averse, which imposes negative e¤ects on
the utility level. Second, the relative money price a¤ects the equilibrium prices,
which, of course, are factors in determining agentsutility levels. For the second
e¤ect, both possibilities of gaining or losing wealth are available. The rst way
is the direct (risk) e¤ects and the second way is the indirect (income) e¤ects.
The distinction between these two e¤ects is helpful for understanding a sunspot
economy and to prove the main results in this paper. All of the analyses are based
on the equivalent maximization problem (PB). I also assume that P  1 in this
section.
Taking the total derivative in Uh (z0h; Bh) with respect to P, we can obtain
dUh
dP =
@Uh
@P|{z}
Direct (Risk) E¤ect
+
@Uh
@z0h
dz0h
dP +
@Uh
@Bh
dBh
dP| {z }
Trading E¤ect
: (1.6)
There are two terms in eqn (1.6). The second term, trading e¤ect, represents
the utility value changes driven by the consumption changes. Later in this section,
I show that this trading e¤ect is the same as an indirect (income) e¤ect, which is
driven by the change of asset price q.
What is a direct risk e¤ect represented by the rst term in eqn (1.6)? As shown
in Figure (1.2), as P increases, the lenders equilibrium point moves from A to C
and the borrowers equilibrium point moves from a to c. The direct e¤ect is the
change of utility values from A(a) to B(b). Assuming that the mean of real returns
is constant in relative price, i.e., "R (P)+R (P) = constant," the household
has the same expected value of ex1 in both points A(a) and B(b). In addition, since
there is no trading e¤ect from A(a) to B(b), the amount of x0 does not change.
Therefore, we can prove the following lemma:
Lemma 1.2 The direct e¤ect is negative.
 
@Uh
@P < 0 where P  1

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Figure 1.2: Income and direct e¤ects
Proof. Without loss of generality, lets assume that R + R = 1. Since
R
R
= 1P ; R
 and R are
R =
P
P +  and R
 =
1
P +  :
Uh (z
0
h; Bh) is
Uh = 
vh

e0h + z
0
h; e
1
h +
P
P + Bh

+ vh

e0h + z
0
h; e
1
h +
P
P + Bh

;
and @U=@P is
@U
@P = 
@vh (x
0
h; x
1
h )
@x1
Bh
@R
@P + 

@vh

x0h; x
1
h

@x1
Bh
@R
@P
= 
@vh (x
0
h; x
1
h )
@x1
Bh

(P + )2 + 

@vh

x0h; x
1
h

@x1
Bh
 
(P + )2
=

(P + )2Bh
0@@vh (x0h; x1h )
@x1
 
@vh

x0h; x
1
h

@x1
1A
Lender (Bh > 0): Since R > R and Bh > 0, x1h > x
1
h . Since vh is strictly
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concave,
@vh(x0h;x1h )
@x1
<
@vh(x0h;x
1
h )
@x1
. Therefore,
Bh
0@@vh (x0h; x1h )
@x1
 
@vh

x0h; x
1
h

@x1
1A < 0:
Borrower (Bh < 0): Since R > R and Bh < 0, x1h < x
1
h . Since vh is strictly
concave,
@vh(x0h;x1h )
@x1
>
@vh(x0h;x
1
h )
@x1
. Therefore,
Bh
0@@vh (x0h; x1h )
@x1
 
@vh

x0h; x
1
h

@x1
1A < 0:
The source of the trading e¤ect is the income change driven by the change of
prices. One interpretation is that a change in the asset price q positively or nega-
tively a¤ects consumer hs income, and consequently, his trading will be adjusted
according to the income change. Choosing q0 as the numeraire price, i.e., setting
q0 = 1, the income e¤ectfrom the change of the asset price is dened as
Income E¤ect =   dq
dPBh:
The following lemma shows that the trading e¤ect is actually the income e¤ect:
Lemma 1.3 Trading e¤ect = Income E¤ect18, i.e.,
1
h

@Uh
@z0h
dz0h
dP +
@Uh
@Bh
dBh
dP

=   dq
dPBh
Proof. The Lagrangian of the maximization problem is dened as
Lh = Uh
 
z0h; Bh;P
  h   z0h + qBh
18Here, " 1h

@Uh
@z0h
dz0h
dP +
@Uh
@Bh
dBh
dP

" can be interpreted as a trading e¤ect on wealth rather than
on utility value.
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The rst order condition is
@Uh
@z0h
=
1
q
@Uh
@Bh
= h > 0 (1.7)
Taking the total derivative of z0h + qBh = 0 with respect to P, we get
dz0h
dP +
dq
dPBh + q
dBh
dP = 0. (1.8)
From equations (1.7) and (1.8), we get
1
h

@Uh
@z0h
dz0h
dP +
@Uh
@Bh
dBh
dP

=
1
h

h
dz0h
dP + hq
dBh
dP

=   dq
dPBh:
During the transition from lower volatility to higher volatility, the direct e¤ect is
always negative. However, the income e¤ect can be negative or positive. When the
positive income e¤ect outweighs the negative direct e¤ect, the households utility
is increasing in relative price, creating an interesting case where the household
prefers the greater price volatility.
By Lemma 3, 1
h
dUh
dP is decomposed into income e¤ects (which are the same as
trading e¤ects) and direct e¤ects. Now, the unit of both e¤ects are wealth/relative
price(P).19
1
h
dUh
dP =
1
h
@Uh
@P| {z }
Direct E¤ect
+   dq
dPBh| {z }
Income E¤ect
: (1.9)
In a regular economy, the set of competitive equilibria is a continuously di¤eren-
tiable function of the endowment allocation. Here we assume that the endowment
19To the best of my knowledge, the term normalized ordinal utility, which is 1h
dUh
dP here, in
the welfare analysis was rst suggested by Donsimoni and Polemarchakis (1994). They showed
that if there is no change in the aggregate endowment in a regular economy, no endowment
redistribution can a¤ect the aggregate change in the normalized utility. They called the changes
of individualsutility through redistribution the relative price e¤ectswhich are basically the
same as the income e¤ectsin our model.
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is a di¤erentiable function of relative price P. Specically, the endowment al-
location is replaced with (e0h   h (P) ; e1h; e1h)Hh=1 where h(P) is a di¤erentiable
function of P. The following lemma shows how the utility levels are a¤ected by
the endowment function:
Lemma 1.4 Assuming that the endowment is dened as (e0h   h (P) ; e1h; e1h)Hh=1,
1
h
dUh
dP is given by
1
h
dUh
dP =
1
h
@Uh
@P| {z }
Direct (Risk) E¤ect
+   dq
dPBh| {z }
Income E¤ect
  @h(P)
@P
Proof. We can prove this lemma in the same way as in Lemma 3 by replacing
eqn (1.8) with
dz0h
dP +
dq
dPBh + q
dBh
dP +
@h(P)
@P = 0:
This Lemma is used in proving Propositions 2. [h (P)]Hh=1 can be interpreted as
balanced lump-sum tax plans in Propositions 2. Finally, the proof of Proposition
2 is presented.
Proof. (Proof of Proposition 2) Assuming that P  1, we compare two
economies: one is an economy with P and the other is an economy with P+ where
P+ > P  1. We need to show that there is a possible wealth redistribution in
the economy (P; E) 2 R++M which leads to a Pareto superior equilibrium to
that in the economy (P+; E) 2 R++M. Without loss of generality, lets choose
p0 as a numeraire price, i.e., p0 = 1. Then, consumer hs budget constraint with
transfers [h(P)]Hh=1 is
x0h +mh = e
0   h(P): (1.10)
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where h(P) is continuously di¤erentiable in P.
The corresponding budget constraint of the equivalent problem (PB) is
z0h + qBh + h(P) = 0: (1.11)
From Lemma 4, we can get:
1
h
dUh
dP =
1
h
@Uh
@P   q
dBh
dP  
@h(P)
@P
Designing the tax plan as
@h(P)
@P =  
dq
dPBh; (1.12)
h(P+) = 0 and h(P) =
R P
P+

@h(P)
@P

dP,
The summation of the transfers is equal to zero by the market clearing condition
of Bh:
P
h h(P) =
P
h
R P
P+

@h(P)
@P

dP
=
R P
P+
P
h
@h(P)
@P

dP
=
R P
P+

dq
dP
P
hBh

dP = 0:
With the tax plan, the utility value change is the same as the risk e¤ect:
1
h
dUh
dP =
1
h
@Uh
@P :
By Lemma 2, the risk e¤ect 1
h
@Uh
@P is negative. Therefore, with the lump-sum
transfer plan [h(P)]Hh=1, complete welfare improvement from the relative price
P+ to P is achieved. That is
1
h
dUh
dP < 0 for all P 2
P+;P and h = 1; 2; 3:::; H.
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Remark 1.2 The proof is based on the assumption that the set of competitive
equilibria is a continuously di¤erentiable function of the endowment allocation (e0h 
h(P); e1h; e1h)Hh=1. Therefore, the proof is not applicable to singular economies.
Remark 1.3 Here, I suggest a new approach for the proof of Proposition 6. The
feasible allocation set is determined on the return-line of the corresponding relative
price. On the feasible set, any equilibrium is constrained Pareto optimal, which is
the same idea in the First Welfare Theorem. (See Diamond 1967.) Second, we
know that the feasible set with the higher volatility is dominated by a set with lower
volatility in the sense that for any allocation in the former, there always exists a
Pareto superior allocation, which is constrained Pareto optimal. Now, the "con-
strained" version of the Second Welfare Theorem plays a crucial role in nishing
the proof. The theorem asserts that for any "constrained" Pareto allocation, there
exists a lump-sum wealth transfer to achieve the allocation in a competitive market.
This completes the proof.
In the proof, I introduce one possible tax plan: the amount of each consumers
tax or transfer is the same as that of the income e¤ect. However, they should
not necessarily be the same to satisfy welfare supremacy in an economy with a
lower level of price volatility. For example, even though a greater amount of tax
is collected than the individuals income e¤ect, the consumer can still get higher
utility levels in a lower level of price volatility because of the strictly positive
direct risk e¤ect. Considering the risk e¤ect, there will be a continuum of welfare-
improving tax plans satisfying the following two conditions:
@h(P)
@P >
1
h
@Uh
@P  
dq
dPBh for all h:
and P
h
@h(P)
@P = 0:
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1.7 Conclusion
The main di¢ culty in research on incomplete markets is that indeterminacy of
equilibrium is usually inevitable. This problem is solved in this paper with the
introduction of a measure of price-level volatility. This paper proposes a method by
which indeterminate economies can be reinterpreted as derived regular economies
for which price-level volatility is a parameter. I show that economies with di¤erent
price volatility levels could be ranked by a compensation test based on balanced
tax plans. This nding implies that sunspot-stabilizing policies are Kaldor-Hicks
e¢ cient.
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CHAPTER 2
SUNSPOTS AND INFLATION-INDEXED BONDS
2.1 Introduction
Sunspots (extrinsic uncertainty) provide explanations of excess volatility for both
the price level and allocations.1 Cass and Shells (1983) seminal paper investigates
sunspot equilibria with excess volatility, by mainly focusing on market situations
in which some consumers are restricted from full market participation. Cass (1989)
further explains that incomplete nancial markets can also allow a continuum of
sunspot equilibria. Kang (2012) also shows that for each level of price volatility
(ination volatility), there is a unique regular sunspot-economy as in Casss (1989)
GEI model. This paper introduces a sunspot-economy where both money and
ination-indexed bond markets are available. The model of the economy is exactly
the same as the Cass GEI model with the addition of the indexed bonds.
Several theoretical studies have attempted to understand the role of indexed
bonds in an economy with ination volatility, but the explanation about the source
of ination volatility varies within the literature. For example, Magill and Quinzii
(1997) assume that ination volatility is from monetary shocks while Geanakoplos
(2005) assumes that it is from intrinsic endowment shocks. This paper assumes
that ination volatility comes from extrinsic shocks (sunspots).
With future ination uncertainty, nominal securities are unsafe and relatively
real securities will be more attractive to risk-averse consumers. Consequently, the
introduction of real securities to an economy with ination volatility can cause the
This essay was presented at the Cornell Macroeconomics Seminar in Fall 2012.
1See Cass and Shell (1983) and Shell (1987, 2008).
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monetary market to be less active. Mas-Colell (1992) and Goenka and Préchac
(2006) have separately shown that the introduction of real securities or ination-
indexed bonds to a sunspot economy can result in a complete shutdown of nominal
nancial markets.2 With riskless securities, there is no incentive for consumers to
take any unnecessary risks by trading in nominal assets.3 In reality, the indexed
bonds are being used as minor supplements for money, not as the main nancial
instrument in monetary markets. This problem can be resolved by introducing a
transaction cost for intermediating indexed bonds. The transaction cost represents
the ine¢ ciency of indexed bonds in contrast to the e¢ ciency of money as a nancial
instrument.4
This paper shows that the introduction of indexed bonds can never cause the
monetary market to shut down. In contrast, the indexed bond market can be com-
pletely inactive if the transaction costs are high enough or the ination volatility
level is low enough. I also show that these bonds have a greater opportunity to be
actively traded as the market has higher ination volatility.
Recently, government ination-indexed bonds have become available in a num-
ber of countries. This paper reveals that there is a possibility for not only gov-
ernments but also nancial entrepreneurs to issue these bonds. Since an economy
2Mas-Colell (1992) indicates that nancial markets can be immune to sunspots by introducing
as many real securities as the number of goods in each state. In addition, Goenka and Préchac
(2006) show that the introduction of ination-indexed bonds completely eliminates sunspot e¤ects
in incomplete markets. The introduction of these real securities results in a complete shutdown
of nominal nancial markets.
3However, with intrinsic uncertainty both riskless and nominal bonds can co-exist. (See
Neumeyer, 1998.)
4Cozzi, Goenka and Shell (2012) have a similar idea that commodity taxes have intermidiation
costs while money taxes do not. Specically, an iceberg cost is incurred when the government uses
a commodity tax system, but no cost is involved when it uses a money tax system. Nevertheless,
the money taxes can be less attractive if the price-levels are unstable due to the e¤ects of sunspots.
Their paper investigates the comparative statics of whether the majority of consumers prefers
commodity taxes versus money taxes when the economy is a¤ected by sunspot signals. Their
model is based on Bhattacharya, Guzman and Shell (1998).
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with ination volatility always has an arbitrage in the values of risk-free securities,
nancial entrepreneurs can also open the market if they have the technology to
access indexed bonds at a small enough cost. When the economy has a higher
level of ination volatility, there will be a larger gap in the values of risk-free assets
and therefore the indexed bond market will be friendlier for prot-seeking nancial
entrepreneurs.
It is counter-intuitive that the introduction of indexed bonds actually can de-
crease some consumerswelfare. This is due to the substitution e¤ects: the in-
troduction of a new asset causes the demand for money to decrease and conse-
quently devalues money. This devaluation has a negative impact on the asset
sellers(borrowers) utility as they sell money (risky asset) at a low price. This sit-
uation could be a matter of concern for governments that need to gain consensus
to adopt a new policy, but it may not apply to prot-seeking nancial entrepre-
neurs. Because the introduction of indexed bonds does not necessarily make the
economy Pareto improving, this paper considers a compensation test based on
lump-sum tax-transfer plans which are denominated in period-0 money. Specif-
ically, it demonstrates that there are balanced lump-sum tax-transfer plans that
would allow the market with indexed bonds to be Pareto superior to one without
indexed bonds.
This paper discusses both single-good and multi-good economies. In a single-
good economy, the payo¤ for indexed bonds is straightforward. However, in a
multi-good economy, the relative prices and the xed commodity bundle from
Consumer Price Index (CPI) generally do not agree across both the agents and
the states. This problem can be resolved and the ideal payo¤s of the ination-
indexed bonds can be dened if all agentspreferences are identically homothetic.
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The outline of this paper is as follows. First, in Section 2, I introduce the
combined market of a single-good economy in which both money and indexed
bonds are available. The existence of a regular economy and the activeness of the
monetary market are shown in Section 3. The impact of ination volatility on
the activeness of the indexed bond market is investigated in Section 4. Section 5
discusses the welfare implications of the introduction of the indexed bonds to the
market. Section 6 introduces a multi-good model where the agents have identical
homothetic preferences at both dates 0 and 1. Section 7 is a brief conclusion. Some
numerical examples are introduced in the appendix.
2.2 Single-good Economy
There are two periods, today and tomorrow, labelled as subscripts t = 0; 1. At
date 1, there are two states, s = ;  having positive probabilities 0 <  < 1 and
 = 1   ; respectively. There are two consumers, labelled as superscripts i 2
I = f1; 2g.5 Consumer is consumption allocation is xi =  xi0; xi; xi 2 X = R3++
corresponding to prices p = (p0; p; p)  0: His endowment is ei =
 
ei0; e
i
; e
i

 2
X where ei = e
i
 = e
i
1: Denote by U the space of C2 utility functions on R2++ which
are twice di¤erentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave, having the closure of
indi¤erence curves contained in R2++ and satisfying the von Neumann-Morgenstern
expected utility hypothesis. Denote by A the set of characteristics (vi; ei) 2 UX.
Consumer is preferences are
ui(xi) = ui
 
xi0; x
i
; x
i


= v
i
 
xi0; x
i


+ v
i
 
xi0; x
i


5Although the model can easily be extended to an economy with more than two consumers,
I restrict the number of consumers to two because too many generalizations could cause readers
to ignore the most important conclusions.
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Throughout this paper, I assume that there is an incentive to trade, i.e., for con-
sumer i and i0 :
@vi (ei0; e
i
1)
@x0
=
@vi (ei0; e
i
1)
@x1
6= @v
i0
 
ei
0
0 ; e
i0
1

@x0
=
@vi
0  
ei
0
0 ; e
i0
1

@x1
This condition implies that the initial endowment is not Pareto e¢ cient. Since
money can be considered a risky asset with sunspots, a lender and a borrower can
be translated into an asset buyer and an asset seller. Lets dene I = fB; Sg where
B and S represent the asset buyer and the seller, respectively.
In a monetary market, there is only one nancial instrument (money). mi de-
notes consumer is money holdings and its nominal return is r which is exogenously
given. An economic fundamental E is simply a list (ui; ei) 2 A, i 2 I = f1; 2g.
Denote the space of economic fundamentals by M where M =Qi2I A. Equilib-
rium in pure monetary markets is dened as follows: There are some positive spot
prices (p0; p; p) 0 and associated money holdings m such that each household
is optimized, (xi;mi) is the solution to the maximization problem, denoted as
max ui
 
xi0; x
i
; x
i


subject to
8>>>><>>>>:
p0x
i
0 +m
i  p0ei0
px
i
  pei1 + rmi
px
i
  pei1 + rmi
and xi 2 X
each market clears, P
i x
i
0 =
P
i e
i
0;
P
i x
i
 =
P
i x
i
 =
P
i e
i
1
and
P
im
i = 0:
I now introduce ination-indexed bonds with a relative transaction cost . The
transaction cost is relative to the trading price. For example, if  = 0:1; 10% of
26
the purchasing price of those bonds help cover the transaction cost. Because of
the existence of , the selling price of the bond is not the same as the purchasing
price. The cost is incurred at date 1, implying that the intermediaries exchange
the transaction fees with the rst period good. Therefore, the market clearing
condition for the rst period is dependent on the amount of the indexed bonds
traded in the market. I label a monetary market with indexed bonds as a combined
market (CM). The equilibrium in CM is dened as
Given Prices (p0; p; p; p), (mi; ni; xi0; x
i
; x
i
)
H
h=1 solve the following maximiza-
tion problem (P-CM)
maxui
 
xi0; x
i
; x
i


subject to
p0x
i
0 +m
i + p (1 + )max(ni; 0) + pmin(ni; 0)  p0ei0 (2.1)
px
i
  pei1 + pni + rmi (2.2)
px
i
  pei1 + pni + rmi (2.3)
Market clear conditions are
P
im
i = 0;
P
i n
i = 0
P
i x
i
0 +
p
p0

P
imax(n
i; 0) =
P
i e
i
0
and
P
i x
i
 =
P
i x
i
 =
P
i x
i
1:
Here, p (1 + ) and p represent the purchasing and selling prices of the indexed
bonds, respectively. The nominal interest rate r does not a¤ect the equilibrium
allocation in both markets. This implies that the nominal interest rate cannot
be the source of the need for ination-indexed bonds if it is deterministic. The
nominal payo¤s of the indexed bonds are p and p in state  and ; respectively.
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For a single-good economy, the government can always design the nominal payo¤s
of those bonds, guaranteeing the same purchasing power across states. However,
dening the payo¤s to buy the same commodity bundle across states is not clear
in a multi-good economy, as discussed in Section 6.
Finally, the budget constraint set in a combined market is still convex, which is
necessary for the existence of single-valued demand functions. In the next section,
I investigate the existence and regularity of the equilibria in a combined market.
2.3 Equilibrium
Kang (2012) dened price-level volatility (ination volatility) based on the relative
standard deviation (RSD) of price-level. In the same way as Kang (2012), ination
volatility in this paper is dened as
R =
(ep1=p0)
E(ep1=p0) (2.4)
where (ep1=p0) and E(ep1=p0) are the standard deviation and the expected value of
the level of ination, respectively.6 Kang (2012) shows that there exists a generic
setM M such that any economy in a pure monetary market (MM), specied
as a pair
 E ; R
M
2M R+ is regular and determinate. In this section, I show
that a regular economy can be dened even in a combined market as xing the
ination volatility level R: In this model, the volatility R is exogenously given,
which implies that the occurrence of non-fundamental volatility does not vanish
nor diminish with the introduction of real securities.
6Price-level volatility and ination volatility based on the relative standard deviation (SRD)
have exactly the same value in a single-good economy. Section 6 shows that in a multi-good
economy, the two volatility measures also have the same value if the ination is dened by the
consumer price index (CPI)
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In a similar method to Kang (2012), I reinterpret nominal security (money)
in terms of a real security as xing the ratio of the price levels in two states
as constant. The following relationship shows that the xing price ratio P is
equivalent to xing the ination volatility R:
R =
(ep1=p0)
E(ep1=p0) =
p
 j1  Pj
 + P :
For a xed price ratio, the ratio of the two statesreturns of money is xed by the
following relationship:
P = p
p
=
r=p
r=p
where

r
p
; r
p

is the return of money in state  and .
Given price ratio P, it is possible to interpret nominal security (money) as a
security with a real return (R; R) satisfying that P = RR . Then, the equivalent
economy with two types of real securities7 can be dened (Lemma 1). Finally, I
show that the economy is regular and determinate (Proposition 1).
First, the equivalent maximization problem based on two types of real securities
is dened as (E-CM)
maxui(ei0 + z
i
0; e
i
1 + n
i +RB
i; ei1 + n
i +RB
i) (2.5)
subject to q0zi0 + qB
i + p (1 + )max(ni; 0) + pmin(ni; 0)  0 (2.6)
where
R
R
=
1
P :
Lemma 2.1 Given P = p=p, P-CM is equivalent to E-CM where
xi0 = e
i
0 + z
i
0; x
i
 = e
i
1 + n
i +RB
i; xi = e
i
1 + n
i +RB
i
mi = qBi; p0 = q0 (= 1) ; p =
rq
R
; p =
rq
R
7One is the equivalent real security to money and the other is the ination-indexed bonds. In
this paper, I call them a risky asset and a risk-free asset, respectively.
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Proof. (i) (P-CM)E-CM) P-CM is dened with the given parameters
(p0; p; p; p; r;P) while the given parameters are (q0; q; R; R; p;P) in E-CM.
Dening p0 and mi as
p0  q0 and mi  qBi;
it is clear that the budget constraint (eqn 2.6) in E-CM can be derived from that
in P-CM. Next, Dening p and p as
p  rq
R
; p  rq
R
;
xi and x
i
 can be expressed as
xi  ei1 + ni +RBi and xi  ei1 + ni +RBi:
Since utility functions are strictly increasing,  can be replaced with =. Finally,
by the equation xi0 = e
i
0 + z
i
0, the utility function (eqn 2.5) in E-CM is the same
as the one in P-CM.
(ii) (E-CM)P-CM) Dening q0 and Bi as
q0  p0; Bi  m
i
q
the period-0 budget constraint (eqn 2.1) in P-CM is equivalent to that (eqn 2.6)
in E-CM. Lets dene xi and x
i
 as
xi  ei1 + ni +RBi and xi  ei1 + ni +RBi:
then, where
R =
rq
p
; R =
rq
p
;
xi and x
i
 can be expressed as
px
i
  pei1 + pni + rmi
px
i
  pei1 + pni + rmi
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which are the same as eqns (2.2) and (2.3), respectively. Finally, because xi0 
ei0 + z
i
0, the utility function in P-CM is equivalent to that in E-CM.
In a competitive equilibrium, the mean of the real return (R; R) does not
a¤ect the equilibrium allocations since the value of q is adjusted according to the
value of the mean. For the convenience of proofs and computation, I assume that
the mean value of the real return is xed as one, i.e., R + R = 1. Below,
all of the analyses are based on the equivalent problem (E-CM).
Proposition 2.1 There exists a generic set M  M such that any economy in
a combined market, specied as a triple
 E ; R; 
C
2 M  R2+; is regular and
determinate.
Proof. In the equivalent maximization problem, the budget sets are convex and
the utility function is strictly concave for all (q0; R; R; q;P ; p)  0. Therefore,
the excess demand is single valued. (The proof can be done by dening a compact
subset of the budget set.)
For the proof of a regular and determinate economy, we need to dene the ag-
gregate excess demand and check if it satises su¢ cient conditions for the existence
of regular economies. The market aggregate demand function is dened as
Z (Q) =
P
i
0BBBB@
zi0 (Q) + 
p
q0
max (ni (Q) ; 0)
Bi (Q)
ni (Q)
1CCCCA
where Q = (q0; q; p)
This market aggregate demand function is not the same as a conventional one
because of the additional term  p
p0
max (ni (Q) ; 0) which is the amount of rst-
period goods the intermediaries charge as transaction fees.
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It can be easily shown that Z (Q) satises the ve properties:
(i) continuous
(ii) homogeneous of degree zero
(iii) (Walraslaw) Q  Z(Q) = 0
(iv) There is an s > 0 such that Z(Q) > ( s; s; s) for all P .
(v) If Qn ! Q; where Q 6= 0 and p = 0, thenPi ni(Q)!1.
Therefore, the economy is regular and determinate. (See Debreu 1970.)
The existence of equilibria does not necessarily imply that either (both) an
indexed bond market or (and) a monetary market are active. The main di¤erence
from previous articles8 dealing with the combined market of money and indexed
bonds in a sunspot economy is that the monetary market in my model is always
active even after the introduction of indexed bonds. The following proposition
shows this.
Proposition 2.2 The monetary market is always active, i.e, mi 6= 0 for some
i 2 I if  > 0.9
Proof. (by contradiction) Lets assume that mi = 0 for i 2 fS;Bg, labeling
the asset buyer (Bi > 0 or mi > 0) as i = B and the asset seller (mi < 0) as i = S.
Assuming that nB = nS = 0, money should be active since the initial endowment
is not Pareto e¢ cient. Next, we need to check the case where nB 6= 0 and nS 6= 0.
8See Mas-Colell (1992) and Goenka and Préchac (2006).
9It is proven that where  = 0, money is not traded in the market and the sunspot e¤ects will
disappear. (See Goenka and Préchac 2006.)
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For this case, we can compute each individuals value of the risky-asset (money).
The value is the ratio between the marginal utility of risk assets and that of the
period-0 good. Lets assume that the risky assets return (R; R) satises that
R + R = 1. Then, the value (price) of the risky asset for the buyer is
computed as
qBR =

@vB(xB0 ;eB1 +RBB)
@BB
+ R
@vB(xB0 ;eB1 +RBB)
@BB

@vB(xB0 ;xB )
@x0
+ 
@vB(xB0 ;xB )
@x0
=
R
@vB(xB0 ;xB )
@x1
+ R
@vB(xB0 ;xB )
@x1

@vB(xB0 ;xB )
@x0
+ 
@vB(xB0 ;xB )
@x0
0B@ R + R = 1
P = R=R
1CA
Since mB = 0(BB = 0), xB = x
B
 . Also, it is true that R + R =  + .
Therefore, we get:
qBR =

@vB(xB0 ;xB )
@x1
+ 
@vB(xB0 ;xB )
@x1

@vB(xB0 ;xB )
@x0
+ 
@vB(xi0;xi)
@x0
:
The right part of the equation above is the same as the asset buyers value of the
indexed bonds. This is also the same as the purchasing price of the indexed bond.
Therefore, we can get
qBR = p(1 + ):
In the same way, we can show that the asset sellers value of a risky-asset is the
same as the selling price of the indexed bond:
qSR = p:
Since qBR > q
S
R, there is a price q 2
 
qSR; q
B
R

in which the two consumers have an
incentive to trade with money. This contradicts that mi = 0 for i = S;B.
Proposition 2 shows that the market for money is still operating even with an
extremely high level of ination volatility if  > 0. However, without a transaction
cost, i.e.,  = 0, the existence of ination volatility makes the market for money
completely shut down, which has been proven in Goenka and Préchac (2006).
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2.4 Indexed Bond Market and Ination Volatility
Although ination-indexed bonds are not issued in a monetary market, the values
of those securities can be computed at the equilibrium. Lets dene piF as the value
of a risk-free asset for consumer i 2 fB; Sg:
piF =

@vi(xi0;xi)
@x1
+ 
@vi(xi0;xi)
@x1

@vi(xi0;xi)
@x0
+ 
@vi(xi0;xi)
@x0
which is the ratio between the marginal utility of risk-free assets and that of the
period-0 good. The following lemma shows that there is an arbitrage between two
values pBF and p
S
F where Band Srepresent the asset buyer and the asset seller,
respectively.
Lemma 2.2 If R 6= 0 in a pure monetary market, then10
pSF < p
B
F :
Proof. q+ represents the equilibrium price of the risky asset in a pure monetary
market.
q+ =
R
@vi(xi0;xi)
@x1
+ R
@vi(xi0;xi)
@x1

@vi(xi0;xi)
@x0
+ 
@vi(xi0;xi)
@x0
0B@ R + R = 1
P = R=R
1CA
Lets label the asset buyer (Bi > 0) as i = B and the asset seller (Bi < 0) as i = S.
Since the initial endowment allocation is not Pareto e¢ cient, they will trade and
therefore BB > 0 and BS < 0. First, we want to show that pBF is higher than q
+.
Since the state  is inationary P > 1, we get: R > R and xB > xB . p
B
F
q+
is
pBF
q+
=

@vB(xB0 ;xB )
@x1
+ 
@vB(xB0 ;xB )
@x1
R
@vB(xB0 ;xB )
@x1
+ R
@vB(xB0 ;xB )
@x1
:
10An economy without ination volatility (R = 0) is the same as a certainty economy. There-
fore, where R = 0 there is no arbitrage, i.e., pSF = p
B
F .
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Since vi is strictly concave, it is true that
@vB
 
xB0 ; x
B


@x1
<
@vB
 
xB0 ; x
B


@x1
:
Since R + R = 1,  +  = 1 and R > , R < ; we can get:
pBF
q+
> 1:
In the same way, we can prove the following:
pSF
q+
< 1.
From the two inequalities, we know that pSF < p
B
F .
The arbitrage in the values of the risk-free securities between two consumers
provides the incentive for them to accept real securities as the nancial instrument
in a combined market. However, the existence of the arbitrage does not necessarily
imply that the indexed bonds are active. The magnitude of the arbitrage should
be large enough, compared to the transaction cost, for the indexed bonds to be
traded in a combined market. The following propositions and corollary show that
the indexed bond markets can be active or inactive depending on the level of
ination volatility and the level of a transaction cost.
Proposition 2.3 If R 6= 0, there exists  2 R++ such that the indexed bond
market is active (inactive) if  < 
 
  , i.e.,
ni
 6= 0 if  < 
= 0 if    for i = S;B:
where
 =
pBF   pSF
pSF
: (2.7)
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Proof. (i) For ni 6= 0 where  < .
(Proof by contradiction) Lets assume that ni = 0 for i = S;B. Then, the
equilibrium allocations in a combined market are the same as those in a pure
monetary market. If  < , there exists p > 0 such that pSF < p < p (1 + ) < p
B
F .
(This can be proven as follows: Let p = pSF + " and  =
pBF pSF 
pSF
> 0. Then, for all
 2  0; pBF   pSF , there exists " which satises the inequality pSF  p < p (1 + ) 
pBF . ) This implies that the two consumers have an incentive to trade with the
indexed bonds. This contradicts that ni = 0.
(ii) For ni = 0 where   .
(Proof by contradiction) Lets assume that ni 6= 0 for i = S;B. Assuming
that   , there does not exist p > 0 such that pSF < p < p (1 + ) < pBF . This
contradicts that ni 6= 0 for i = S;B.
Next, it will be shown that as the market has higher ination volatility (more
uncertainty about the future price level), there are more chances for the indexed
bond market to be active. In the model, the decision about whether nancial
entrepreneurs should enter the market (or whether the government should issue
bonds) depends on the value of . For a smaller value of , there would be a
smaller chance for nancial entrepreneurs to survive in the market. The following
proposition shows the direct connection between the value of  and the level of
ination volatility.
Proposition 2.4 If vi is additively separable, i.e., vi (xi0; x
i
1) = f
i(xi0) + g
i(xi1), 
is strictly increasing in R. (See Appendix for the proof.)
Proof. (See Appendix for the proof.)
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The proposition is the extended version of lemma 1 saying that  is strictly pos-
itive where R > 0 and equals zero where R = 0. The proof for the non-separable
utility functions remains open. Proposition 4 implies that as the economy has
higher ination volatility, nancial entrepreneurs have a better chance of making
a prot and consequently stronger incentive to enter the indexed bond market.
From Propositions 3 and 4, we derive the following result.
Corollary 2.1 If vi is additively separable, for any  > 0, there exists a constant
R 2 R++ such that only the monetary market is active if R < R while both
indexed bond and monetary markets are active if R  R:
Proof. Trivial from Propositions 3 and 4.
2.5 Welfare
A combined market provides consumers more trading choices than a pure monetary
market. Therefore, it can be expected that the equilibrium in the combined market
is Pareto superior to that in the pure monetary market. However, it has been
shown that nancial innovations to incomplete markets do not necessarily induce
the economy to be Pareto improving.11 Financial innovations are known to a¤ect
market prices under a general equilibrium setting. These price changes negatively
a¤ect agentsreal wealth and consequently, their utility values. Specically, the
introduction of the indexed bonds causes the value of money to decrease due to
substitution e¤ects, which have a negative impact on asset sellers(borrowers)
wealth.
11See Cass and Citanna (1998), Elul (1995) and Hart (1997) .
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The following example is the case where the introduction of indexed bonds
make some consumers worse o¤. There are two consumers who have the same
expected utility functions v1 = v2 = log(x0) + log(x1) and whose endowments
are e1 = (10; 0) and e2 = (0; 10). In this case, as the level of ination volatility
increases, the second consumers utility value increases. The intuition is as follows.
For a high level of ination volatility, the real return of assets becomes small in an
inationary state. If the inationary state is realized, the rst consumer will end
up getting a small amount of the good at date 1 and consequently his utility will
be particularly low. Therefore, the rst consumers demand for the asset will be
higher to insure against the ination state in a higher level of ination volatility.
The high demand of the rst consumer results in a high price (value) of the risky
asset (money). Finally, the second consumer, who sells the risky asset (money) to
the rst one, obtains more income as the asset price goes higher in a pure monetary
market.
However, the introduction of new riskless securities, which are substitutes for
money, has caused a considerable decrease in money demand. Therefore, the value
of money in a combined market is smaller than that in a pure monetary market.
A decrease in the money value negatively a¤ects the second consumers utility
level. In this example, even though the asset seller has more trading choices in the
combined market, his utility level is actually lower than that in the pure monetary
market. (See the Appendix for more details about the example.)
Although some of the consumers may be negatively a¤ected, it is not possible
for all of them to be worse o¤ by the introduction of the indexed bonds according
to the revealed preferences hypothesis. The following proposition shows this.
Proposition 2.5 (i) For any economic fundamental E M, there exists at least
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one consumer who is better o¤. (ii) However, all consumers can be better o¤ for
some economic fundamentals inM.
Proof. (i) When the value of money, which is considered q in the equivalent
problem, is not the same in both markets, there must be at least one consumer
who will benet from the change of the value. (The consumer should be the asset
buyer (seller) if the value decreases (increases) in a combined market.) Since the
consumer has more choices in the combined market, according to the revealed
preference argument, the consumer must be better o¤.
(ii) If variation in the value of money is small enough or zero, according to
revealed preference argument, all consumers can be better o¤.
The introduction of the indexed bonds can be considered a sunspot-stabilizing
policy in the sense that it makes the equilibrium allocations less volatile.1213 How-
ever, Proposition 5 shows that the introduction of indexed bonds does not neces-
sarily make all agents better o¤. This means that the government can fail to gain
consensus in adopting the nancial innovationthe introduction of the indexed
bonds. However, Proposition 6 shows that if balanced lump-sum tax plans are
allowed along with nancial innovations, consumer consensus on the policy can be
achieved. Although there is no clear Pareto ranking between a combined econ-
omy and a pure monetary economy, it can be shown that a combined economy is
Kaldor-Hicks superior to a pure monetary economy by considering a compensation
12More accurately, the relative standard deviation (RSD) of the excess demand
fx   e1; x   e1;; g is lowered with the introduction of the indexed bonds.
13However, it is di¤erent from conventional sunspot-stablizing policies because it cannot com-
pletely eliminate the consumption volatility unless the transaction cost is zero. Several studies
have suggested stabilizing policies to completely eliminate the e¤ects of sunspots on incomplete
markets. Three dominant policies have been shown: 1) the introduction of new types of nominal
securities. (see Cass and Shell 1983 [Proposition 3] and Balasko 1983 [Theorem 1]); 2) the intro-
duction of as many real securities as the number of goods in each state (see Mas-Colell 1992 );
and 3) the introduction of options. (see Antinol and Keister 1998 and Kajii 1997).
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test based on balanced lump-sum tax-transfer plans. The space of the balanced
lump-sum tax plans is dened as
T =

( 1; :::;  I) 2 RI jPi2I  i = 0	 :
The tax-transfer plan  is applied to either the combined economy or the pure
monetary market. Then, the budget constraints at date 0 are modied to be
s:t
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
p0x
i
0 +m
i + p (1 + )max(ni; 0) + pmin(ni; 0)  p0ei0    i
px
i
  pei1 + pni + rmi
px
i
  pei1 + pni + rmi
(P-CM)
The budget constraints in the second period are invariant. Assuming that p0 = 1,
we can interpret that the taxes and transfers are denominated by the period-0
commodity.
Denition 2.1 Market "A" is Kaldor-Hicks superior to market "B", i.e.,
market A KH market B,
if there exist(s)  2 T such that market A with the tax-transfer plan  is Pareto
superior to market B:
In the above denition, the tax-transfer plans are applied to only the rst
market (market A) but not to the second market (market B).
The following proposition shows that a combined market is superiorto a pure
monetary market based on the compensation principle.
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Proposition 2.6 For any E 2 M ; R > 0 and  > 0;
 E ; R; 
C
KH
 E ; R
M
and  E ; R
M
KH
 E ; R; 
C
.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Propositions 5 and 6 shows that there is no clear Pareto ranking between mon-
etary and combined economies but there does exist Kaldor-Hicks welfare ranking
between the two economies. In the same way, it is possible to compare two types of
combined economies with di¤erent levels of transaction costs. Surprisingly, there
are some consumers (among asset sellers) who prefer an economy with higher trans-
action costs since higher transaction costs make the value of money higher, which
is preferred by asset sellers (borrowers). (See the Appendix for a detailed numeri-
cal example.) In the same sense as Proposition 6, it can be shown that a combined
economy with lower transaction costs is Kaldor-Hicks superior to an economy with
higher costs, i.e.,
 E ; R; 1C KH  E ; R; 2C if 1 < 2.
I do not put the results as a proposition since this can be considered somewhat
trivial.
2.6 Multi-good Economy
The object of this section is to construct a more realistic model by extending the
number of commodities in each spot from one to L > 1. To clearly distinguish the
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notations from the single-good case, I use the symbol  !in all vectors in a multi-
good economy. Consumer is consumption allocation is  !x i =   !x i0; !x i; !x i 2
X = R3L++ where
 !x is =
 
xis1; :::; x
i
sl; ::::; x
i
sL

s = 0; ; :
Corresponding prices are  !p = ( !p 0; !p ; !p ) 2 R3L++  0 where
 !p s = (ps1; :::; psl; ::::; psL) s = 0; ; :
Consumer is endowment is  !e i =   !e i0; !e i; !e i 2 X where  !e i =  !e i =  !e i1 and
 !e it =
 
eit1; :::; e
i
tl; ::::; e
i
tL

t = 0; 1
Then, the budget constants in the multi-good economy are:
 !p 0   !x i0 +mi + p(1 + )max
 
ni; 0

+ pmin
 
ni; 0
   !p 0   !e i0
 !p    !x i =  !p    !e i1 + !p    !w 1ni + rmi (2.8)
 !p    !x i =  !p    !e i1 + !p    !w 1ni + rmi (2.9)
where  !w 1 is a xed commodity bundle from the consumer price index (CPI).
The payo¤s of indexed bonds are based on nominal returns  !p   !w 1 and !p   !w 1
in the states  and , respectively. The question is whether all consumers will
buy the same xed commodity bundle  !w 1 across the states with nominal returns
 !p s   !w 1, s = ; .14 In a single good-economy, the answer is always yessince
consumers have no other choice except purchasing the single good. However, in
a multi-good economy, it is not trivial to dene the payo¤s of indexed bonds,
14This is the same question as whether the indexed bonds have the exact same e¤ects on the
economy as real securities.
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which guarantee the same purchasing power across the states, without any further
restrictions on preferences.
To deal with this issue, it is necessary to dene the Consumer price index
(CPI) in this paper. The payo¤s of TIPS15 is based on the CPI. CPI consists of
two factors: the xed commodity bundle and the price index. These factors should
be estimated in advance to design the optimal indexed bonds. The weighted factor
is the vector of the reference consumption-bundle. It can be dened as
 !w t = (wt1; wt2; :::; wtl; :::; wtL) where t = 0; 1
where wtl represents the quantity of good l at date t.
The second factor in CPI is the (relative) price index. It can be dened as
 !
pi t = (pit1; pit2; :::; pitl; :::; pitL) where t = 0; 1:
where pitl represents the price of good l at date t.
To design TIPS payo¤s guaranteeing the same purchasing power across agents
and states, the following conditions should be satised
(1) There exists a common xed commodity bundle at date 1 for all agents
(2) There exists a common price index at date 1 across states.
To get a consistent price index and commodity bundle, additional restrictions
on utility functions and endowments are required. One advantage of our model
is that the endowments across states are identical and consequently there are no
relative-price uctuations from endowment shocks. Therefore, we do not need any
15Treasury Ination Protected Securities (TIPS) are U.S. ination-indexed bonds whose
coupons and principal are adjusted according to the evolution of the consumer price index.
In the paper, ination-indexed bonds and Treasury ination-protected securities represent the
same thing.
43
more restrictions on endowments. However, we still need an additional assumption
on utility functions:
Assumption 2.1 Utility functions ui; i 2 I are weakly separable across states and
identically homothetic within states. That is, there exist functions vi for all i 2 I
and f such that16
vi : R2 ! R; i 2 I
which are smooth, strictly increasing and strictly concave, and functions
f : RL+ ! R
which are smooth, strictly increasing, strictly concave, having the closure of in-
di¤erence curves contained in RL++ and homogeneous of degree one. Then, ui is
dened as
ui
  !x i0; !x i; !x i = vi  f   !x i0 ; f   !x i+ vi  f   !x i0 ; f   !x i :
The following lemma shows that a common commodity bundle and price index
exist at both date 0 and 1.
Lemma 2.3 If Assumption 1 holds, the price index and the xed commodity bun-
dle can be expressed as
 !
pi t = c
pi
t rf (et) and  !w t = cwt  !e t t = 0; 1
where
 !e t = (et1; :::; etL) =
P
i e
i
t:
16The two theoretical articles for the ination-indexed bonds from Geankoplos (2005) and
Magill and Quinzii (1997) used almost the same utiliy format. Both articles assumed a homothetic
embedded function f
 
xi

at date 1 and utility vi based on utility f .
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and
cpit ; c
w
t > 0
Proof. Since (1) all the agentsspot-utility functions f () are identical, and (2)
the aggregate endowment in each spot is deterministic, there exists a representative
agent at each spot with a utility function f() at both date 0 and 1 and whose
endowment is  !e t (=
P
i e
i
t) at date t. Then,
 !
pi t and rf ( !e t) are collinear by
rst-order conditions of the representative agents. Since f() is homothetic,  !x it
and  !e t are collinear for all i 2 I. Therefore, the xed commodity bundle can be
dened as  !w t = cwt  !e t.
 !
pi t and
 !w t are estimated by the government to design the payo¤s of the indexed
bonds. cpit and c
w
t are positive constant, and their values do not a¤ect the equilib-
rium allocation since the price of the indexed bond, pis automatically adjusted
according to cpit and c
w
t . Therefore, the government can assign any values to c
pi
t
and cwt . For the convenience of notation, I normalize
 !w t as (1; wt2; :::; wtl; :::; wtL)
and
 !
pi t as satisfying that
 !
pi t   !w t = 1.
Remark 2.1 Geanakoplos 2005 also assumed a homogeneous degree of one f(xis)
which is dened in the commodity space at date 1. In his model, there exists in-
trinsic uncertainty on endowments and therefore, the aggregate endowment across
states is not identical. In that case, it is not possible to derive any common CPI
price and commodity bundle, even with the homothetic utility functions. However,
he pointed out that the payo¤s which guarantee the same utility in terms of the em-
bedded utility f(xis) still can be achievable. This is due to the homogeneity of degree
one of f(xis). In my model, the payo¤s of those bonds guarantee both the same CPI
commodity bundle and the same utility since there is no intrinsic uncertainty.
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Lemma 3 shows that common relative prices
 !
pi1 exist across the states. There-
fore, the price in each state can be expressed as
 !p  = p !pi1 and  !p  = p !pi1;
where p are p scalars, which are determined endogenously. In the same way, the
prices in period 0 can be expressed as  !p 0 = p0 !pi0. Then, consumer is budget
constraints can be modied as:
p0
 !
pi0   !x i0 +mi + p(1 + )max
 
ni; 0

+ pmin
 
ni; 0
  p0 !pi0   !e i0
p
 !
pi1   !x i = p
 !
pi1 
  !e i1 + ni !w 1+ rmi (2.10)
p
 !
pi1   !x i = p
 !
pi1 
  !e i1 + ni !w 1+ rmi
where
 !p = ( !p 0; !p ; !p ) =

p0
 !
pi0; p
 !
pi1; p
 !
pi1

:
In this section, p0; p are p scalars, which are determined endogenously, but
they do not represent the prices of any specic good. The return of the indexed
bonds can be interpreted as real or nominal returns.  !w 1 is the consumption bundle
vector of the real return of the bonds while p
 !
pi1 !w 1 and p !pi1 !w 1 are the nominal
returns, which have the same purchasing power to have the consumption bundle
 !w 1 across the states. Whether the returns are delivered in terms of commodities
or money, it does not a¤ect the equilibrium allocations nor prices. The values of
the two scalars p and p depend on price-level volatility; however, the price index
ratio
 !
pi1 and the commodity bundle
 !w 1 do not. Therefore, the government can
perfectly estimate the weighted factor  !w 1 and the price index  !pi1 even without
any information about price volatility R.
Next, we need to dene price-level volatility and ination volatility in a multi-
good economy. Since the relative prices are the same across states, the price-
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level volatility can be computed with the same formula as that in the single-good
economy:
R =
(ep1l)
E(ep1l) = (ep1)E(ep1) for all l 2 L
=
p
 jp   pj
p + p
=
p
 j1  Pj
 + P
where ep1 = fp; p; ; g is a random variable and P = pp  1.
At a xed value of price-level volatility R, the indeterminacy is eliminated
even in a multi-good economy.17 Next, I show that a multi-good economy can be
mathematically equivalent to that of a single-good economy if Assumption 1 holds.
With the xed commodity bundle and the price index, the utility maximization
problem can be re-dened in terms of only the rst good (l = 1) in each spot.
Then, the maximization problem of the multi-good economy is equivalent to that
of the single-good economy. In this case, the utility function can be expressed with
only the period-0 good (l = 1) :
vi
 
f(xi0); f(x
i
s)

= vi
 
xi01f(
 !w 0); xis1f( !w 1)

;
since f is the homogeneous degree of one and xi0 = x
i
01
 !w 0 and xis = xis1 !w 1 for
s = ; .
Also, with the relation
 !
pi t   !w t = 1, the budget constraints in (2.10) can be
replaced with
p0x
i
01 +m
i + p(1 + )max
 
ni; 0

+ pmin
 
ni; 0
  p0ei01
px
i
1 = p
 !
pi1   !e 1 + ni

+ rmi (2.11)
17Cass (1992) indicated that in an incomplete nancial market of a conventional two-period
model, sunspots can generate D = S   J nominal and real indeterminacy with S sunspot states
and 0 < J < S distinct types of bonds. Therefore, the set of the equilibria, without specifying
the level of ination volatility, has one degree of indeterminancy. In my model, as xing the level
of ination volatility, one degree of indeterminacy can be eliminated.
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px
i
1 = p
 !
pi1   !e 1 + ni

+ rmi:
Then, the maximization problem is exactly the same as that of the single-
good economy with a modication in endowment
 !
pi0   !e i0;
 !
pi1   !e i1

and utility
vi (xi01f(
 !w 0); xis1f( !w 1)) :
Finally, we need one more clarication about market clearing conditions in
period0. In a single-good economy, it is clear that the intermediaries use the rev-
enue from transaction fees to purchase a single good since there is no alternative
substitute except the good. However, in a multi-good economy, we need to spec-
ify the intermediariesutility function to determine the corresponding quantity of
commodity choices at date 0 from the nominal quantity of the intermediariess rev-
enue. It would be reasonable to assume that the intermediariesutility function at
date 0 is the same as f(x0). Then, the intermediariesaggregate budget constraint
in the spot market at date 0 is
 !p 0   !x 0 = p
P
imax(n
i; 0): (2.12)
According to the assumption that the intermediariesutility function at date 0 is
the same f( !x 0),  !x 0 is collinear with  !w 0. Assuming that  !x 0 = s !w 0, we get the
value of s from eqn. (2.12):
 !p 0  s !w 0 = p
P
imax(n
i; 0)) s = p
P
imax(n
i; 0)
 !p 0   !w 0 :
Therefore, the intermediatess demand function  !x 0 can be derived as
 !x 0 = p
P
imax(n
i; 0)
 !p 0   !w 0
 !w 0 = p
P
imax(n
i; 0)
p0
 !
pi0   !w 0
 !w 0
=
p
p0

P
imax(n
i; 0) !w 0: (2.13)
From eqn (2.13), we know that  !x 0 is homogeneous degree one in prices, which is
a necessary property in proving the existence and regularity of an economy.
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Finally, the market clear conditions can be expressed as
P
im
i = 0;
P
i n
i = 0
P
i x
i
01 +
p
p0

P
imax(n
i; 0) =
P
i e
i
0i
which are equivalent to those in a single-good economy.18
Therefore, all of the results including Propositions 1-6 can be directly applied
for a multi-good case.
Proposition 2.7 If Assumption 1 holds in a multi-good economy, the following
are true:
(i) A regular economy given price-level volatility R is dened. (Proposition 1)
(ii) Money is always traded if  > 0. (Proposition 2)
(iii) There exists a  such that the indexed bonds are (not) traded if  <

 
 > 

. (Proposition 3)
(iv)  strictly increases in price-level volatility R if vi is additively separable.
(Proposition 4)
(v) (+) There exists at least one consumer who is better o¤. (++)All consumers
can be better o¤ for some economic fundamentals. (Proposition 5)
(vi) A combined market is superior to a (pure) monetary market based on
the compensation principal (Proposition 6).
18The market clearing condition for period-0 good can be derived from the following equations:P
i
 !x i0 +
p
p0

P
imax(n
i; 0) !w 0 =
P
i
 !e i0;
 !x i0 = xi01 !w 0 and
P
i
 !e i0 =
 P
i e
i
01
 !w 0
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The denition of price-level volatility is still clear in a multi-good economy since
there is no variation in relative prices across states. In contrast, the ination level
between two periods can vary depending on which commodity is considered when
dening ination because
 !
pi0 and
 !
pi1 are not necessarily linearly independent.
Nevertheless, there is no ambiguity in determining the ination volatility based on
the CPI. The ination from the CPI is dened as
e = c !p 1   !w 1 !p 0   !w 0
where  !p 1 (= f !p ; !p ; ; g) is a random variable vector and c is some positive
constant. With the two equations:
 !
pi t   !w t = 1 and  !p s = ps !pi t   !w t for s = ; ,
 can be expressed as e = c !p 1   !w 1 !p 0   !w 0 = c0 ep1p0 :
where ep1 = fp; p; ; g is a random variable and c0 is some positive constant.
Finally, we can show that the ination volatility based on the CPI is the same as
the price-level volatility R.

e
E
e =  (ep1)E (ep1) = R
2.7 Concluding remarks
This paper shows that ination-indexed bonds can be more actively traded in an
economy with higher ination volatility, which is exogenously given. In the same
way, we can show that the uncertainty of a nominal interest rate can provide room
for ination-indexed bonds.19 This idea is basically the same as in Magill and
Quinzii (1997). Using a two-period general equilibrium model, they show that the
19To show this, the nominal returns in two states should be distinguished, i.e., r 6= r .
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Central Banks imperfect process of controlling the money supply can cause the
economy to prefer indexed bonds. While ination volatility is based on market
psychology, volatility in the nominal interest rate is caused by an inconsistent
monetary policy.
Recently, a signicant number of such ination-indexed bonds have been issued
in many countries. These bonds are taking up a more important position as widely
accepted nancial instruments. The ndings of the study can provide a better
understanding of these bonds from a theoretical point of view.
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CHAPTER 3
INFLATION-INDEXED BONDS AND NOMINAL BONDS:
FINANCIAL INNOVATION AND ASSET TRADING
3.1 Introduction
Economists have long advocated for the creation of ination-indexed bonds, mainly
based on the premise that indexed bonds are benecial substitutes for nominal as-
sets, whose payo¤s are contaminated by ination volatility. However, this paper
demonstrates that borrowers would be even worse o¤ with the introduction of
indexed bonds, as this situation causes equilibrium interest rates of nominal secu-
rities to increase when agents have precautionary saving motives. In an economy
without indexed bonds, agents face income uncertainty from uctuations in real
payo¤s of nominal securities. The income risks from nominal securities prompt
agents to have a demand for precautionary savings, which drives up the equi-
librium price of nominal securities. However, the introduction of indexed bonds
relaxes the precautionary savings demand for nominal securities in two ways: it
decreases income risks as agents trade in indexed bonds (risk-free asset) and also
can be a substitute for nominal securities for the purpose of precautionary savings.
The decrease in demand for nominal securities, by innovation on indexed bonds,
results in a decrease in the equilibrium price of nominal securities (equivalently,
an increase in a return of the securities). To clearly understand the impact of
precautionary motives on a change in the equilibrium price through nancial in-
novation, I use quasi-linear utility functions to suppress the impact of marginal
utility of a date-0 good to be constant because relative asset prices also depends
This essay was presented at the Cornell/Penn State Macroeconomic Conferences, KAIST,
SK research institute, UNIST and NTU. .
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on the marginal utility of the date-0 good.
This paper also demonstrates the separate roles of risk aversion e¤ects and
precautionary e¤ects in nancial innovation. The e¤ects of risk aversion in nancial
innovation on indexed bonds induces the trading volume of nominal securities
to be driven down but surprisingly has no impact on the equilibrium nominal
interest rates. This result implies that using mean-variance preferences based on
the Capital Asset Price Model (CAPM), where agents lack precautionary savings
motives, overestimates the borrowerswelfare gains but underestimates the savers
gains by nancial innovation on indexed bonds. More importantly, as CAPM-
based utility functions minimize the impact of nancial innovation on existing asset
prices, Pareto improvement with the introduction of indexed bonds is guaranteed,
as shown in Geonakoplos (2005) and Magill and Quinzii (1997).
To understand the impact of nancial innovation, the model needs to ensure
the coexistence of the two types of bonds. However in a standard frictionless
GE model, the introduction of ination-indexed bonds results in a complete shut-
down of nominal security markets if the economy is contaminated with ination
uncertainty. The assumption of frictionless asset markets leads to this empirically-
unsupported result because agents have no incentive to take any unnecessary risks
by trading in nominal securities when riskless assets such as indexed bonds are
feasible.1 Therefore, this paper assumes proportional transaction costs in asset
trading. Under the assumption that transaction costs of indexed bonds are higher
than those of nominal bonds, this paper shows that both types of securities would
1For example, illiquidity of Treasury Ination-Protected Securities (TIPS) relative to nominal
securities is believed to result in high TIPS yields with a liquidity premium. DAmico, Kim and
Wei (2009), and Pueger and Viceira (2011) empirically estimated a liquidity premium in TIPS
yields ranging from 0.4% to 1% in each year since TIPS were rst issued in 1996. See Shen
(2006), DAmico, Kim and Wei (2009), Fleming and Krishnan (2009) for a detailed empirical
analysis of TIPS liquidity risks, yields, and trading volumes. See also Campbell, Shiller and
Viceira (2009); Dudley, Roush and Ezer (2009); Gürkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2010).
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be active in the market.
The theoretical background of the invention of ination-indexed bonds is based
on the fact that a monetary economy cannot be free from ination uctuations
and thus nominal securities should have an ination risk premium. To explain
how ination and ination uncertainty are generated from monetary shocks, the
model in this paper incorporates the quantity theory of money, in which price
levels are directly a¤ected by the money supply. Specically, agents must sell their
entire endowment for money in each period, which also is assumed in Diamond
(1984), Lucas (1980; 1990), and Magill and Quinzii (1992).2 Then, the price level
is no longer a free variable in the economy but endogenously determined by the
quantity of money and the total aggregate endowment.
In this paper, preferences and endowments are assumed to be state independent
while the distinction among states is characterized by the di¤erent amounts of
money supply. Without any real economic fundamental uctuations across states,
there is no reason for the central bank to provide di¤erent quantities of money.
Therefore, any monetary shocks in this model can be interpreted as a source of
instabilityin a monetary policy.
This paper also derives intuitive results about the impact of monetary insta-
bility (equivalently, the impact of ination volatility) on nancial markets and
welfare.3 As the level of monetary instability is increasing, the maximum possible
transaction cost for indexed bonds being active is also increasing. In addition,
when the economy with the mean-variance preferences has a more unstable mon-
2Lucas (1980) and Magill and Quinzii (1992) interpreted an endowment as endowed labor,
which cannot be consumed directly by the endowment owner but can be transformed into con-
sumption goods with a constant return. In addition, this paper assumes that the endowment is
also used as transaction costs for operating nancial and commodity markets.
3In this paper, the measure of monetrary instatibility is dened as a relative standard deviation
of monetary shocks. See Section 5.1.
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etary policy, the trading volume of nominal bonds decreases while that of indexed
bonds increases.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the main
model of this paper based on the quantity theory of money. Section 3 deals with the
existence and uniqueness issues of equilibrium. Section 4 shows the comparative
statistics of the active/inactive bonds market in the space of transaction costs.
Section 5 shows the impact of monetary policy instability on bond market trading
volumes. Section 6 investigates how nancial innovation on indexed bonds a¤ects
the return of nominal securities and welfare based on the theory of precautionary
savings. Section 7 concludes.
3.2 Economy
3.2.1 Preference and Endowment
There are two periods, date-0 and date-1, labelled as subscripts t = 0; 1. At date
1, there are two states, s = ;  having positive probabilities 0 <  < 1 and  =
1  ; respectively. There are two agents, labelled as superscripts i 2 I = f1; 2g.
Agent is consumption allocation is xi =
 
xi0; x
i
; x
i

 2 X = R3++ corresponding
to prices p = (p0; p; p)  0: His endowment is ei =
 
ei0; e
i
; e
i

 2 X where
ei = e
i
 = e
i
1: Denote by U the set of two agentsutility functions which are twice
di¤erentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave, having the closure of indi¤erence
curves contained in R2++ and satisfying the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected
utility hypothesis. Denote by e the set of two agents endowments. Agent is
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preferences are
ui(xi) = ui
 
xi0; x
i
; x
i


= v
i
 
xi0; x
i


+ v
i
 
xi0; x
i


(3.1)
3.2.2 Monetary policy and Price level
In this paper, monetary shocks are the only source of ination uncertainty.4 The
following monetary economy model was initially introduced in Magill and Quinzii
(1992). The price levels are determined by the quantity of money supply (quantity
theory of money) and the aggregate endowment. Throughout this paper, we as-
sume that the money supply at date 1 is large enough to maintain the equilibrium
nominal interest rate not to be negative.
The monetary policy is characterized as (M0;M;M) which represents the
quantity of the money supply from the Central Exchange in each state. In subpe-
riod 1 at state s, the Central Exchange injects a quantity of money Ms. Agents
can hold the money in the exchange with endowments. At this step, the price level
of the economy is determined by the following equation:
Ms = ps
P
i2I
eis , ps =
MsP
i2I
eis
(3.2)
where s= 0; ; 
For the given the price level ps by eqn (3.2), the amount of money holdings for
each agent is determined by the following equation:
mis = pse
i
s (3.3)
4Kang (2012a) shows that the GEI model with pure inside money, whose model was originally
developed by Cass (1989; 1992) can have ination uncertainty triggered by sunspots.
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As Magill and Quinzii (2002) indicated, the initial endowment eis also can be
interpreted as the amount of labor that agent i holds. Agent i exchanges the labor
for money through the Central Exchange. The labor can be used to produce a
consumption good with linear technology and also to operate nancial/commodity
markets. The amount of labor used in operating the nancial markets represents
the nancial transaction costs, which are introduced in the next section.
3.2.3 Security and commodity markets
There are two types of bonds: a nominal bond with a nominal return, and an
indexed bond whose payo¤s are adjusted by the price level. The transaction costs
in the security markets are incurred at date 0; hence the purchasing prices of
securities are higher than the selling prices. The prices and payo¤s of the two
bond markets are summarized in Table 1 below.
Table 3.1: Security transaction costs
transaction
cost
buying
price
selling
price
nominal
return
nominal bond n qn (1 + n) qn (1; 1)
indexed bond d qd (1 + d) qd (p; p)
The amount of transaction costs for obtaining one unit of security is propor-
tional to the purchasing or selling prices. For example, if the purchasing price is
$100 and the relative transaction cost  is 5%, then $5 (5% of $100) is incurred as
the transaction fee at date 0. To dene the market clearing condition, we need to
assume that the date-0 endowment is used up for operating the nancial transac-
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tion.5 There is also a proportional transaction cost c in the commodity market.
The transaction cost in the commodity market is not the main interest in this
paper, but it should be considered because it is usually believed that operating
commodity markets is more costly than operating nancial markets. Denote by 
the set of transaction costs (n; d; c)
At date 0, agents make portfolio and consumption decisions with the money
they hold, mi0 for i 2 I. The quantity of money an agent i holds, mi0 is determined
by agent is endowment and price level. (See eqn (3.3).) In the notation, mis
represents the amount of agent is money holding before assessing the security
markets while m0is represents the money holding after the security markets but
before accessing the commodity markets. The amount of money holding at each
subperiod of date-0 and 1 is summarized in Table 2 below.
Table 3.2: Time line
Time line
security
market
commodity
market
money
holding
mis m
0i
s
m0is date 0
0 date 1
The amount of money holding immediately before agents access the commodity
market is determine by their portfolio decision:
m0is = m
i
0  
8>>>><>>>>:
qn (1 + n)max (z
i
n; 0) + qnmin (z
i
n; 0)
+qp (1 + p)max (z
i
d; 0) + qpmin (z
i
d; 0)
+mi01
9>>>>=>>>>; (3.4)
mi01 is the amount of money stored at date 0 to use at date 1, which is not
5Foley (1970) also assumed real resource (endowment) costs in the operation of commodity
markets and analyzed the consequences of the costs.
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allowed to be negative. Agents would have no incentive to carry money balances
from date-0 to date 1, if the borrowing nominal interest rate was not negative, i.e.,
1
qn(1+n)
> 1. A positive nominal interest rate can be achieved if the money supply
at date 1 is large enough compared to that at date 0. In this paper, we assume
that the Central Exchange has a monetary plan to maintain a positive nominal
interest rate. With this assumption, there is no incentive for agents to hold money
at date 0, i.e., mi01 = 0.
Agent i accesses to the commodity markets with the amount of money m0i0 :
m0i0 = p0 (1 + c)x
i
0 (3.5)
where c is a proportional transaction cost in the commodity market. Combining
eqns (3.3), (3.4), and (3.5), we can get the following simple budget constraint at
date 0:
p0 (1 + c)x
i
0 (3.6)
+qn (1 + n)max
 
zin; 0

+ qnmin
 
zin; 0

+qd (1 + d)max
 
zid; 0

+ qdmin
 
zid; 0

= p0e
i
0
In the same way, at date 1 the amount of money holding immediately before
agentsaccess to commodity market is determine by the portfolio payo¤s:
m0is = m
i
s + z
i
n + psz
i
d; s = ;  (3.7)
Agent i accesses to the commodity markets with the amount of money m
0i
s :
ps (1 + c)x
i
s = m
0i
s ; s = ;  (3.8)
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Combining eqns (3.3), (3.7), and (3.8), we get the following budget constraint:
ps (1 + c)x
i
s = pse
i
s + z
i
n + psz
i
d; s = ;  (3.9)
3.2.4 Denition of Equilibrium
With the assumption that the money supply at date 1 is large enough to maintain
a positive nominal interest rate, we can dene the equilibrium of the economy from
eqns (3.2), (3.6), and (3.9).
An equilibrium of the economy E (U; e;M; ) is a pair of actions and prices
(xi; zi)
I
i=1 ; (p; q)

, where p = (p0; p; p) and q = (qn; qd) such that
(1) xi 2 argmax fU i(xi)jxi 2 Bi(p; q; ei; )g ; for i 2 I.
(2) (Monetary market clearing condition)
ps
P
i2I
eis =Ms; s = 0; ; 
(3) (Security market clearing condition)
P
i2I
zin = 0 and
P
i2I
zid = 0:
(4) (date-0 commodity market clearing condition)
p0
P
i2I
(1 + c)x
i
0 + qn
P
i2I
max (zin; 0) + qd
P
i2I
max (zid; 0) = p0
P
i2I
ei0
(5) (date-1 commodity market clearing condition)
P
i2I
ei1 = (1 + c)
P
i2I
xi = (1 + c)
P
i2I
xi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where the budget constraint is dened as
Bi(p; q; ei; ) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
xi 2R3+=f0gj
p0 (1 + c)x
i
0
+qn (1 + n)max (z
i
n; 0) + qnmin (z
i
n; 0)
+qd (1 + d)max (z
i
d; 0) + qdmin (z
i
d; 0)
= p0e
i
0
ps (1 + c)x
i
s = pse
i
s + z
i
n + psz
i
d; s = ; 
9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
(3.10)
3.3 Existence and Uniqueness
3.3.1 Overview
Because of the presence of security transaction costs, the budget constraint is not
di¤erentiable when there is no trade in a security. If the equilibrium is on the
kink point (non-di¤erentiable point of the budget constraint), the price of the
asset is not locally unique; thus Debreus (1970) approach for regular economies is
not applicable. However, this di¢ cult can be resolved by the general equilibrium
(GE) property that if there is no trade in a security whose net supply is zero, the
equilibrium allocations without the security is identical to those with the original
economy (Property 1). Based on this idea, we dene four di¤erent economies:
an economy with both types of bonds, an economy only with a nominal security,
an economy only with an indexed security and an economy with no securities. I
show that each economy is regular when the feasible bonds in each economy are
traded. To prove this, I borrow the methodology which was used to prove regular
economics in Debreu (1970). The next step, which is introduced in Section 4, is to
check whether the security markets are really active or inactive, i.e., to check which
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economyis trueamong the four economies. For this step, I use another GE
property that if a security market is not active, there is no available security prices
(including buying and selling prices) for the security being tradable in equilibrium
(Property 2). Specically, under the assumption that the indexed bond market
is inactive, we can derive equilibrium allocations by Property 1. Then, we can
compute the agentsvalues (potentially prices) of the indexed bond.6 Finally, we
can check whether the gap between the two agentsvalues of the indexed bond
is large enough so that there are no available buying and selling prices for the
indexed bond being tradable. If the gap is not large enough, the assumption that
the indexed bond markets are inactive is wrong and thus the equilibrium should
be derived from the di¤erenteconomy with an indexed bond market.
The complete proof of the existence and local uniqueness is done in both this
section and Section 4. As mentioned above, we assume that there are four di¤er-
enteconomies in this section. Section 4 shows that given the nancial transaction
costs (n; d), only one economy from the four di¤erenteconomies is trueand
eventually there are four di¤erent active/inactive regions of security markets in the
space of transaction costs (n; d). See Figure 3.1.
Before going on to the main proof of this section, I introduce a simple trick to
deal with the commodity transaction cost for the convenience of math.
3.3.2 Commodity transaction costs
For the convenience of the existence and uniqueness proofs, it would be necessary
to simplify the mathematical steps associated with the commodity transaction
6These values are the ratio of the marginal utility of the indexed bonds, relative to the marginal
utility of date-0 good.
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costs. Dening the utility function vi as
vi
 
xi0; x
i
1

= vi

xi0
1 + c
;
xi1
1 + c

(3.11)
where
 
xi0; x
i
1

= (1 + c)
 
xi0; x
i
1

or 
xi0; x
i
; x
i


= (1 + c)
 
xi0; x
i
; x
i


; (3.12)
the original maximization problem becomes identical to that of vi
 
xi0; x
i
1

and the
zero commodity transaction cost c = 0. vi still satises the properties such as
monotonicity and concavity, which are described in Section 2-1. Therefore, we can
solve the equilibrium with vi and
 
xi0; x
i
; x
i


and recover the original equilibrium
allocations
 
xi0; x
i
; x
i


from eqn (3.12).7 For simplication of the notations, from
this point in this paper, vi and
 
xi0; x
i
; x
i


are assumed to be vi and
 
xi0; x
i
; x
i


,
respectively. Then, the economy can be dened with a zero commodity transaction
cost.
3.3.3 Existence and uniqueness
By suppressing the commodity transaction cost as zero, agent imaximization is
as follows:
max
xi0;z
i
n;z
i
d
v
i

xi0; e
i
1 +
1
p
zin + z
i
d

+ v
i

xi0; e
i
1 +
1
p
zin + z
i
d

(3.13)
7In addition, If vi is homothetic, c does not have real e¤ects on equilibrium asset prices and
trading volumes.
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s:t
p0x
i
0
+qn (1 + n)max (z
i
n; 0) + qnmin (z
i
n; 0)
+qd (1 + d)max (z
i
d; 0) + qdmin (z
i
d; 0)
= p0e
i
0
(3.14)
where
ps =
MsP
i2I
eis
; s = 0; ; :
In the maximization problem described in eqns (3.13) and (3.14), agent i
chooses (xi0; z
i
n; z
i
d) at date 0. Based on the three variables for the optimal choices
(xi0; z
i
n; z
i
d), we can dene the following three market clearing conditions:
P
i2I
ei0 =
P
i2I
xi0  
qn
p0
n
P
i2I
max
 
zin; 0
  qd
p0
d
P
i2I
max
 
zid; 0

; (3.15)
P
i2I
zin = 0 and
P
i2I
zid = 0 (3.16)
Finally, the original economy is simplied as the economy with optimal choices
(xi0; z
i
n; z
i
d) given prices (p0; qn; qd) and market clearing conditions for (x0; zn; zd).
8
Then, we can dene the market aggregate demand functions of (xi0; z
i
n; z
i
d) given
prices (p0; qn; qd), which are shown in the proof of Proposition 1 in this section.
Although the budget constraints are not di¤erentiable at zin = 0 and z
i
d = 0, the
budget constraint sets are connected and convex, hence each agents maximization
problem has unique equilibrium allocations given any prices. Therefore, it can be
shown that where zin 6= 0 and zid 6= 0, the economy has a nite number of local
unique equilibrium prices and allocations. When one of the security markets is
8The commodity market clearing conditions for xi and x
i
 are automatically satised if the
security market clearing conditions in eqn (3.16) hold.
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inactive (the equilibrium is at the kink), for example zin = 0, the equilibrium price
qn is not locally unique. Even in this case, all the equilibrium allocations and all
the prices except the price of the inactive security are locally unique. The proof of
Poposition1 is based on the GE property that if a nancial market is inactive, the
nancial market has no real impact on the economy. In other words, the economy
with an inactive nancial market has the same equilibrium allocations with the
economy without the nancial market.
Proposition 3.1 The economy E (U; e;M; )
(1) is regular if zin 6= 0 and zid 6= 0.
(2) has locally unique equilibrium allocations and prices except qn if zin = 0 and
zid 6= 0:
(3) has locally unique equilibrium allocations and prices except qn if zin 6= 0 and
zid = 0:
(4) has locally unique equilibrium allocations and prices except (qn; qd) if zin = 0
and zid = 0:
Proof. Case (1): For the proof of a regular economy, we need to dene the
aggregate excess demand and check that it satises su¢ cient conditions for the
economy to be regular. The market aggregate demand function is dened as
Z(P ) =
0BBBB@
P
i2I
zi0(P )  qnp0 n
P
i2I
max (zin; 0)  qnp0 d
P
i2I
max (zin; 0)
zin(P )
zid(P )
1CCCCA
where P = (p0; qn; qd) and z
i
0(P ) = x
i
0(P )  ei0:
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In the market aggregate demand functions, qn
p0
n
P
i2I
max (zin; 0) and
qd
p0
d
P
i2I
max (zid; 0)
represents the amount of the transaction costs in the two nancial markets, respec-
tively. It can be easily shown that Z(P ) satises the ve properties:
(i) continuous
(ii) homogeneous of degree zero
(iii) (Walraslaw) P  Z(P ) = 0
(iv) There is an s > 0 such that Z(P ) > ( s; s; s) for all P .
(v) If P n ! P; where P 6= 0 and qn = 0, then
P
i2I
zin(P )!1.
Therefore, the economy is regular and determinate. (See Debreu 1970.)
Case (2): Since the indexed bond market is inactive, the equilibrium allocations
from the original economy are the same as those in the economy without the
indexed bond market. Under the economy without the indexed bond market, the
market aggregate demand function is dened as
Z(P ) =
0B@
P
i2I
zi0(P )  qnp0 n
P
i2I
max (zin; 0)
zin(P )
1CA ;
where P = (p0; qn) and z
i
0(P ) = x
i
0(P )  ei0:
Where zin 6= 0, Z(P ) satises that the ve properties and a regular economy
can be dened.
Case (3): We can prove it in the same way as (2).
Case (4): The proof is trivial. In this case, the two types of security markets
are totally inactive and thus agents consume their own endowments.
66
A regular economy does not always guarantee globally unique equilibrium but
in most cases including an economy with log-linear preferences or with quasi-
linear preferences, which are the two main numerical examples in this paper, a
globally unique equilibrium does exist. Proposition 1 shows the existence and
local uniqueness of the equilibrium allocations in the four distinct cases but does
not indicate under what conditions the equilibrium belongs out of the four cases.
The next section answers that question.
3.4 Active and Inactive nancial markets
3.4.1 Overview
The main results in this section are as follows. Figure 3.1 represents the four
di¤erent regions in the space of two transaction costs. There is a 45 degree line
which bisects region 1 and region 3. If the transaction costs are in region 1, both
nominal and indexed bond markets are active. In region 3, the indexed bond
market is active while the nominal bond market is inactive. At the top end of
the 45 degree line, there is an L-shape hall, in which both security markets are
inactive. In the upper-left region above the 45-degree line, there is an increasing
curve which bisects region 1 and region 2. The 45-degree line and the L-shape
hall is not a¤ected by the monetary policy. In contrast, the 1-2 bisecting curve
is shifting up as the measure of monetary instability RM
9 is increasing, which is
proven in Section 5. Under the perfectly stable monetary policy, i.e., RM = 0,
the curve converges to the 45-degree line and thus the region 1 is eliminated.
Propositions 2-4 in this section show that the four regions are determined in the
9See Section 5.1 for the denition of monetary instatibility RM .
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Figure 3.1: Transaction costs and asset trading
way described in Figure B.1.
Before going on the proof, we dene an equivalent asset to the nominal secu-
rity for the convenience of proofs. The new risky asset bi has endogenously deter-
mined selling and purchasing prices qb and (1 + d) qb and returns (r; r) which
are uniquely determined by price levels at date 1 through the following relations:
(r; r) =
1

p
+

p

1
p
;
1
p

: (3.17)
The expected real return of the equivalent bonds is "1" which is also the real
return of the indexed bond. Replacing the nominal bond with the new asset
does not change the equilibrium allocations because the ratio of returns across the
states are identical. The prices of the new asset and the nominal security have the
following relations:
qn = qb


p
+

p

Through this paper, I use the equivalent asset b instead of zn for computational
convenience.
68
3.4.2 Case (4) - L-shape hall
In this model, agents have to access to the commodity markets to get consumption
goods but they may not need to access nancial markets if their initial endowment
is nearPareto optimal allocation. This section investigate the condition when at
least one type of nancial market is active. Assuming that there are no transaction
costs, i.e., n = d = 0, the condition for active nancial markets is that the
endowment allocation is not Pareto optimal. That is, there are two agents i and
i0 such that
@vi (ei0; e
i
1)
@x1
=
@vi (ei0; e
i
1)
@x0
6= @v
i0
 
ei
0
0 ; e
i0
1

@x1
=
@vi
0  
ei
0
0 ; e
i0
1

@x0
: (3.18)
For an economy with nancial transaction costs, we need a more strict condition
than condition (3.18). The following proposition indicates the condition that at
least one type of security markets is active.
Proposition 3.2 At least one type of security market is active if and only if
max
i;i02I
24 @vi(ei0;ei1)@x1 =@vi(ei0;ei1)@x0
@vi
0(ei00 ;ei
0
1 )
@x1
=
@vi
0(ei00 ;ei
0
1 )
@x0
35 > 1 + min (n; d) (3.19)
Proof. At the endowment allocation, agent is marginal utility of a nominal
security bi is given by

@vi (ei0; e
i
1 + rb
i)
@bi
jbi=0 +  @v
i (ei0; e
i
1 + rb
i)
@bi
jbi=0;
which has the same value as @vi (ei0; e
i
1) =@x1 since r + r = 1. In the same
way, we can show that the marginal utility of an indexed bond at the endowment
allocation is also the same as @vi (ei0; e
i
1) =@x1. Then, the marginal utility of the
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nominal bond (and the indexed bond), relative to that of the date-0 good, for the
agent i and agent i
0
are given as
wi =
@vi (ei0; e
i
1)
@x1
=
@vi (ei0; e
i
1)
@x0
and (3.20)
wi
0
=
@vi
0  
ei
0
0 ; e
i0
1

@x1
=
@vi
0  
ei
0
0 ; e
i0
1

@x0
(3.21)
Without loss of generality, we assume that wi is higher than wi
0
. Now, we need
to check whether they have an incentive to get access to security markets. If
there exists a selling price which is higher than wi
0  p0 and a buying price which
is lower than wi  p0 for at least one of the two types of security markets, the
security market will be active. Assuming that the price of the security is q, the
necessary condition for the active security market is that
wi
0
<
q
p0
<
q
p0
(1 + ) < wi: (3.22)
The necessary and su¢ cient condition for the existence of the value of q, which
satises inequality (3.22) is that
wi
wi0
> (1 + ) (3.23)
If inequality (3.23) is violated for both n and d, the two types of securities are
completely inactive. Therefore, the necessary and su¢ cient condition for at least
one type of security market is operating in that
wi
wi0
> min (1 + n; 1 + d)
which is equivalent to condition (3.19).
If n = d = 0, condition (3.19) is equivalent to the condition that the initial
endowment is not Pareto optimal, which is condition (3.18). As the value of
min (n; d) is higher, the area for non-active nancial markets is larger in the
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Figure 3.2: Active asset markets
Edgeworth box in Figure B.2.10 The endowment area, in which nancial markets
are inactive, is the area in between the two same-shaped curves. If min (n; d) is
zero, i.e., if the asset markets are frictionless, the inactive-area is the same as Pareto
optimal allocations, which is the single solid curve in Figure 3.2. As min (n; d)
increases, the inactive-area also increases. Through this paper, I assume that the
condition in Proposition 2 holds; thus, agents have access to at least one type of
nancial markets.
3.4.3 Cases (1) and (3) - the 45 degree line
This section shows that if the transaction cost of an indexed bond is the same as
that of a nominal bond (the 45-degree line in Figure 3.1), only the indexed bond
market is active but the nominal bond market is not. In contrast, if a nominal
bond has lower transaction costs than an indexed bond (above the 45-degree line
in Figure B.1), the nominal bond market does not shut down. The following
10The example is based on the following economy: u1
 
x10; x
1
1

= 12 log x
1
0 +
1
2 log x
1
1;
u2
 
x20; x
2
1

= 23 log x
2
0 +
1
3 log x
2
1; e
1
0 + e
2
0 = e
1
1 + e
2
1 = 1.
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proposition addresses these issues.
Proposition 3.3 (a) If n < d (above the 45-degree line in Figure 1), a nominal
bond market is active (b) If n  d (below the 45-degree line in Figure 1), a
nominal bond market is inactive while an indexed bond market is active.
Proof. (a)(n < d). (by contradiction)We assume that the nominal security
market is inactive, i.e., zin = 0 (i.e., b
i = 0) for all i 2 I. Under the assumption
that condition (3.19) holds, the indexed bond market should be active. Then, it
is true that zid 6= 0 for all i 2 I. Among the two agents in the economy, one is a
saver with zsd > 0 and the other is a borrower with z
b
d < 0, where the superscript
s and b represent a saver and a borrower, respectively.
For the equilibrium allocation11, we can compute the value of the nominal
security bi. The savers relative value (price) of the nominal security, denoted as
qsr=p0where p0 is the price level at date 0, is computed as
qsr
p0
=

@vs(xs0;es1+rbs)
@bs
+ 
@vs(xs0;es1+rbs)
@bs

@vs(xs0;xs)
@x0
+ 
@vs(xs0;xs)
@x0
(3.24)
=
r
@vs(xs0;xs)
@x1
+ r
@vs(xs0;xs)
@x1

@vs(xs0;xs)
@x0
+ 
@vs(xs0;xs)
@x0
=
@vs(xs0;xs)
@x1
@vS(xs0;xs)
@x0
since bi = 0 and xs = x
s
. q
s
r=p0 is the same as the purchasing price of an indexed
bond relative to the date-0 good price because
qd(1 + d)
p0
=
@vs(xs0;xs)
@x1
@vS(xs0;xs)
@x0
: (3.25)
From eqns (3.24) and (3.25), we can get
qsr = qd(1 + d): (3.26)
11This equilibrium allocation is from an economy without a nominal security market. Check
case 3 in Section 3.
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In the same way, we can show that the borrowers value of the nominal security is
the same as the selling price of the indexed bond:
qbr = qd: (3.27)
Since qsr = q
b
r (1 + d) and n < d, there is a price qb 2
 
qbr; q
s
r

satisfying that
qbr < qb < qb (1 + n) < q
s
r : (3.28)
The inequality qbr < qb implies that the borrower is willing to sell the nominal
security at the price of qb and the other inequality qb (1 + n) < qsr implies that
the saver is willing to buy the nominal security at the price of qb (1 + n). This
contradicts that there is no tradable price for the nominal security. Therefore, the
assumption that a nominal security market is inactive is wrong.
Proof. (b)(n  d). In the same way in proof (a), we can derive qsr and
qbr in an economy where a nominal security is not feasible. Then, we can shows
that if n  d, there is no available price qb 2
 
qbr; q
s
r

which satises that (1)
qsr = q
b
r (1 + d) and (2) q
b
r < qb < qb (1 + n) < q
s
r . This implies that even if a
nominal security is introduced, the security market is not active if n < d. Under
the assumption that condition (3.19) holds, the indexed bond market should be
active.
Proposition 3 also indicates that if no transaction cost is assumed, i.e., n =
d = 0, there will be zero demand or supply for the nominal security. That implies
that the introduction of an indexed bond, in a standard frictionless GE model,
causes a complete shutdown of nominal security markets. However, empirical
evidences show that a trading volume of a nominal bond is not signicantly a¤ected
by the introduction of an ination-indexed bond.
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3.4.4 Cases (1) and (2) - the curve
In Figure (3.1), there is a curve bisecting region 1 and region 2. Where the trans-
action cost (n; d) is in region 1, both nominal and indexed security markets are
active. However, as (n; d) is approaching the curve, the trading volume of the
indexed bond converges at zero. In this section, I prove that there exists such a
curve if the monetary policy is unstable, i.e., M 6=M. For the proof of the main
result in this section, we assume that an indexed bond is infeasible, which is Case
2 in Proposition 2. Even under the assumption that indexed bond market does not
exist, the values of those bonds can be computed at the equilibrium allocations of
the economy. Lets dene qif as the value of a risk-free asset for agent i 2 f1; 2g:
qif =

@vi(xi0;xi)
@x1
+ 
@vi(xi0;xi)
@x1

@vi(xi0;xi)
@x0
+ 
@vi(xi0;xi)
@x0
 p0;
which is the ratio between the marginal utility of risk-free assets and that of the
period-0 good. The following lemma shows that there is an arbitrage between two
values qsf and q
b
f where sand brepresent a saver and a borrower, respectively.
Lemma 3.1 If M 6=M, then12
qsf > q
b
f (1 + n) :
Proof. q+b and q
+
b (1 + n) represents the equilibrium selling and buying prices
of the nominal security bi, respectively, in a pure monetary market. At the equi-
librium allocation, q+b and q
+
b (1 + n) are
q+b =
r
@vb(xb0;xb)
@x1
+ r
@vb(xb0;xb)
@x1

@vb(xb0;xb)
@x0
+ 
@vb(xb0;xb)
@x0
 p0:
12WhereM =M , there is no arbitrage, i.e., qsf = q
b
f (1 + n) :An economy without monetary
volatility (M =M) is equivalent to a certaintyeconomy.
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and
q+b (1 + n) =
r
@vs(xs0;xs)
@x1
+ r
@vs(xs0;xs)
@x1

@vs(xs0;xs)
@x0
+ 
@vs(xs0;xs)
@x0
 p0:
where the superscripts s and b represent the saver and the borrower, respectively.
Under the assumption that condition (3.19) holds, agents will trade the nominal
security and therefore bs > 0 and bb < 0. First, we want to show that qsf is higher
than q+b (1 + n).
qsf
q+b (1+n)
is
qsf
q+b (1 + n)
=

@vs(xs0;xs)
@x1
+ 
@vs(xs0;xs)
@x1
r
@vs(xs0;xs)
@x1
+ r
@vs(xs0;xs)
@x1
: (3.29)
Without loss of generality, we assume that state  is inationary, i.e., M > M.
Then, we get the following two inequalities: r > r and thus, xs > x
s
. Since v
i
is strictly concave and xs > x
s
, we can get the following relation:
@vs (xs0; x
s
)
@x1
<
@vs
 
xs0; x
s


@x1
: (3.30)
Since r + r = 1,  +  = 1 and r > , r < ; from eqns (3.29)
and (3.30), we can get:
qsf
q+b (1 + n)
> 1: (3.31)
In the same way, we can prove the following:
qbf
q+b
< 1: (3.32)
From inequalities (3.31) and (3.32), we know that qsf > q
b
f (1 + n).
The arbitrage in the values of a riskless security between two agents provides
the incentive for them to accept indexed bonds as a nancial instrument. However,
the existence of the arbitrage does not necessarily imply that the indexed bonds
markets are active. The magnitude of the arbitrage should be large enough for an
indexed bond to be traded in a nancial market. The following proposition shows
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that the indexed bond market can be active or inactive depending on the level of
ination volatility and the level of transaction costs.
Proposition 3.4 If the monetary policy is unstable, i.e., M 6= M, there is a
constant d such that if d < d (d  d), an indexed bond market is active
(inactive) where
d =
qsf   qbf
qbf
> n:
Proof. First, we can prove that
qsf qbf
qbf
> n from Lemma 1.
(i) Proof for zid 6= 0 (active indexed bond market) where d < d.
(Proof by contradiction) Lets assume that zid = 0 for i 2 s; b. Because d <
d

=
qsf qbf
qbf

, there exists qd > 0 such that qbf < qd < qd (1 + d) < q
s
f . (This
can be proven as follows: Let qd = qbf + " and d =
qsf qbf 
qsf
> 0. Then, for
all  2  0; qsf   qbf, there exists " > 0 which satises the inequality qbf < qd <
qd (1 + d) < q
s
f . ) This implies that the two agents have an incentive to trade the
indexed bond. This contradicts that zid = 0.
(ii) Proof for zid = 0 (inactive indexed bond) where d  d.
(Proof by contradiction) Lets assume that zid 6= 0 for i 2 s; b. Because d  d,
there does not exist qd > 0 such that qbf < qd < qd (1 + d) < q
s
f . This contradicts
that zin 6= 0 for i 2 s; b.
Proposition 4 indicates that the curve bisecting regions 1 and 3 exists above
the 45-degree line in Figure 3.1. This implies that if the two types of bonds have
the same level of transaction costs, the nominal bonds markets would completely
shut down but the indexed bonds markets do not. Several empirical papers have
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suggested that the indexed bonds markets have higher liquidity costs than the
nominal bond market, and consequently the trading volume of the indexed bonds
are considerably smaller than that of the nominal security. Proposition 4 supports
this empirical result as showing that the trading volume of indexed bonds is low
for a higher transaction.
3.5 Unstable monetary policy and Financial markets
3.5.1 Measure of monetary instability
This section proposes a measure of monetary instability and investigates how the
trading volumes of bonds are a¤ected by the measure. The measure is dened as
RM
fM = 
fM
E
fM (3.33)
where fM = fM;M; ; g.  fM and E fM represent the standard de-
viation and the expected value of fM , respectively. There is a reason I dene
the measure of monetary uncertainty in terms of a relative standard deviation.
In the model of this paper, any proportional changes in money supply does not
change the equilibrium allocation. Specically, an economy E (U; e;M; ) has the
same equilibrium allocations with an economy E (U; e; M; ) for any  > 0. The
relative standard deviation is the measure which is also invariant with any propor-
tional changes in the random variable, i.e., RM
fM = RM fM for any  > 0.
Therefore, we can dene the economy with the measure of monetary instability
RM instead of M .
Because there is no real economic fundamental uctuations in the model, the
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relative standard deviation of ination uncertainty has the same value as the mea-
sure of monetary instability. Where ination is is = ps=p0   1, s = ,, we can
dene ination volatility Ri as
Ri
ei = 
ei
E
ei : (3.34)
where ei = fp=p0   1; p=p0   1;; g : The value of ination volatility Ri is
exactly the same as that of monetary instability RM in the model of this paper.
3.5.2 The impact of monetary instability on four regions
In this section, we assume that the vNM utility function vi(xi0; x
i
1) is time additively
separable. It is intuitive that as the monetary policy is more unstable, i.e., RM
is increasing, an indexed bond has more chance to be active while a nominal
bond less chance. The following proposition shows that the cut-o¤ curve bisecting
region 1 and region 2 in Figure B.1 is shifting up as the monetary policy becomes
more unstable. That means that the maximum possible transaction cost for the
indexed bond market being operated is increasing in the measure of monetary
policy instability RM .
Proposition 3.5 If vi is time additively separable, i.e., vi (xi0; x
i
1) = f
i(xi0)+g
i(xi1)
for all i 2 I, as RM is increasing, d is increasing.
Proof. For the proof of this proposition, we need the following Lemma.
Lemma 3.2 In an economy without an indexed bond market, xs is increasing but
xs is decreasing in 
R
M where the superscript "s" represents a saver. (See the
Appendix for the proof.)
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Remembering that qif is dened as
qif =
g
i0 (xi) + g
i0
 
xi

f i0 (xi0)
 p0
then,
qbf
q+
and
qsf
q+(1+n)
are
qbf
q+
=
g
b0
 
xb

+ g
b0
 
xb

rgb
0 (xb) + rg
b0
 
xb

and
qsf
q+ (1 + n)
=
g
s0 (xs) + g
s0
 
xs

rgs
0 (xs) + rg
s0
 
xs
 :
We need to show that d
dP

qbf
q+

< 0 and d
dP

qsf
q+

> 0. There are four variables
r (P) ; r (P) ; xi (P) and xi (P) which should be considered in the total deriva-
tives of
qbf
q+
and
qsf
q+
. The total derivatives can be divided into two parts:
d
dP

qsf
q+ (1 + n)

=
d
dP
 
g
s0 (xs) + g
s0
 
xs

rgs
0 (xs) + rg
s0
 
xs
!
xs;xs=constant
+
d
dP
 
g
s0 (xs) + g
s0
 
xs

rgs
0 (xs) + rg
s0
 
xs
!
r;r=constant
: (3.35)
Since gi is strictly concave and xs > x
s
 for the saver, g
s0 (xs) < g
s0
 
xs

. Because
r (P) and r (P) increases and decreases in P, respectively, and r (P) +
r (P) is constant in P,
d
dP

rg
s0 (xs) + rg
s0  xs
xi;x
i
=constant
< 0:
Therefore, the rst term in eqn (3.35) is strictly positive.
The second term can be expressed as
T (G) =
 + G
r + rG
where G =
gs
0  
xs

gs0 (xs)
T (G) is increasing in G since  > r and + = r+r. dTdP is positive
since dx
s

dP > 0;
dxs
dP < 0 (by lemma) and strictly concavity of g
0
. Thus, the second
term also increases in P and d
dP

qsf
q+(1+n)

> 0.
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Figure 3.3: Unstable monetary policy and asset trading
We can prove that d
dP

qbf
q+

< 0 in the same way. Finally,
d
dP
 
qsf   qbf
qbf
!
=
d
dP
 
qsf
qbf
!
=
d
dP

qsf
q+

=
d
dP
 
qbf
q+
!
> 0:
Proposition 5 indicates that when monetary policy is more unstable, region
1 is enlarging while region 2 is shrinking as the curve bisecting regions 1 and 2
is shifting up. In contrast, regions 3 and 4 are invariant with the change in the
monetary policy. See Figure 3.3.
3.5.3 Bond trading volume and Quasi-linear quadratic
preferences
This section discusses how the trading volume of bonds are a¤ected by the measure
of monetary instability RM . Trading volume of nominal and indexed bonds are
dened as qnzsn and qdz
s
d respectively where the superscript s represents the
saver. Since there are only two agents in this model, the savers asset holdings, zsn
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and zsd directly represents the trading volumes of nominal and indexed bonds.
As the economy has higher excess ination volatility, agents feel more risk averse
in trading nominal securities. Therefore, it can be expected that the trading volume
of a nominal bond would decrease while that of an indexed bond would increases
as the measure of monetary instability increases. However, this is not typically
true in a general equilibrium model because asset prices are not invariant with
the changes in a monetary policy. Since asset trading volumes are also a¤ected
by asset prices, the trading volumes are not necessarily increasing or decreasing
in the measure of monetary instability RM . To make equilibrium asset prices not
to be a¤ected by the monetary policy, in this section we assume that preferences
are represented by quasi-linear quadratic preferences. These preferences suppress
the motives of precautionary savings and the e¤ects of the marginal utility of
date-0 goods when the economy experiences changes in a monetary policy. In
Figure 3.4, the dashed line represents the feasible allocations line by the nominal
security, in the space of excess demand for date-1 good. The slope of the line is
r=r which is the same asM=M. As RM increases, i.e.,M=M decreases where
M > M, the feasible allocation line deviates more from the 45-degree line. Thus,
both savers and borrowers would feel more risk averse in trading in a nominal
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security. By the increase in the e¤ects of risk aversion, both the saver and the
borrower have incentives to decrease the demand and supply for a nominal bond,
respectively. (See Figure 3.5(a)) When both asset supply and demand curves, in
the supply/demand analysis, are shifting to the left at the same magnitude, there
will be a decrease in trading volume of the asset but no change in the asset price.
In contrast, the motives for precautionary savings make both agents to have
additional demand (i.e., negative supply) when they face income risks that are
originated from the uncertain real payo¤s of nominal securities. As the monetary
policy is more unstable, the line becomes more deviated from the 45-degree line
and consequently agents, who have assets or liabilities in nominal securities, will
face higher income risks. These income risks increase the demand (or negative
supply) for precautionary savings, thus the nominal asset prices are increasing,
as well. (See Figure 3.5(b).) The changes in asset prices through the e¤ects of
precautionary savings a¤ect agentsoptimal decisions on securities. Therefore, if
agents are motivated to have precautionary savings, i.e., the third derivative of
marginal utility is positive, it is not obvious how the trading volume of the assets
will be a¤ected by an unstable monetary policy.
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I provide a more detailed explanation about why the prices are xed under
quasi-linear quadratic preferences in Section 7. The following proposition shows
that in an economy with quasi-linear quadratic preferences, the trading volume of
bonds monotonically increases or decreases as the monetary policy becomes more
unstable.
Proposition 3.6 If vi (xi0; x
i
1) = 
i
0x
i
0 + g
i(xi1) where (g
i)
0
> 0; (gi)
00
< 0 and
(gi)
000
= 0, for any given transaction costs (n; d), as RM increases, the trading
volume of a nominal bond decreases while the trading volume of an indexed bond
increases.
Proof. It can be proven directly from eqns (C.20) and (C.21) in the Appendix.
3.6 Financial innovationthe introduction of an indexed
bond
3.6.1 Precautionary savings and nominal interest rates
Precautionary savings are extra savings caused by future income being random
rather than determinate. In a partial equilibrium model, Leland (1968) and
Sandmo (1970) have demonstrated that when marginal utility is convex, agents
are motivated to have precautionary savings. This concept is important to under-
stand the impact of nancial innovation on the prices of existing assets.13 Several
13In a standard GE model, nancial innovation refers to the introduction of a new security. In
the economy with nancial transaction costs, nancial innovation can be interpreted as that the
transaction cost of the newassets is decreasing from an inactive region to an active region.
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research papers have suggested that the precautionary motive can be a main cause
for an increase in the equilibrium interest rate when new securities are introduced
in the market. Weil (1993) shows that if marginal utility is convex and the endow-
ment is symmetric across agents and states, then the nancial innovation, which
completes the market, will result in an decrease in the existing security prices. In
addition, Elul (1997) and Willen (2005) shows that nancial innovation can result
in an increase in the equilibrium interest rate when the marginal utility of expo-
nential preferences is convex. Even though it has been shown that precautionary
savings e¤ects, in general, lead to a decrease in the equilibrium interest rate, it is
not obvious to derive an unambiguous conclusion that nancial innovation always
decreases the nominal interest rate even if the marginal utility is convex. This is be-
cause the precautionary saving motive is not the only source of changes in nominal
interest rates. The marginal utility from date-0 goods and intrinsic (endowment)
uncertainty can matter in the changes of existing asset prices. The economy in
this paper does not have intrinsic shocks; therefore, we only need to care about
the marginal utility of date-0 good. To eliminate the e¤ect of the marginal utility
of date-0 good, we dene the following quasi-linear functions:
vi
 
xi0; x
i
1

= i0x
i
0 + g
i(xi1)
where i > 0; (gi)0 > 0; (gi)00 < 0. With these preferences, the relative asset prices
to date-0 good are invariant with the level of consumption at date 0.
The following proposition shows that if the marginal utility is convex, i.e.,
agents have precautionary saving motives, then the introduction of an indexed
bond results in an increase in the nominal interest rate.
Proposition 3.7 If (gi)000 > 0 for all i 2 I, the introduction of an indexed bond
induces borrowing and lending interest rates to increase.
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Proof. The equilibrium purchasing and selling prices of the nominal bond, in
an economy without an indexed bond, are given by
qb (1 + n) =
rg
s0 (xs) + rg
s0
 
xs

s0
(3.36)
and
qb =
rg
b0
 
xb

+ rg
b0
 
xb

b0
(3.37)
where superscripts s and b represent a saver and a borrower, respectively. In Figure
3.6, the dashed line with a slope p=p represents a set of feasible allocations
through nominal securities. The points a and a represent the equilibrium excess
demands of the saver and the borrower, respectively. Market clearing conditions
imply that the two points are symmetrical to (0; 0). By the introduction of indexed
bonds, the equilibrium allocation moves into some point in the area between the
45-degree line and the feasible allocation line. Lets dene the random variable ey =
xs   es1; xs   es1; r; r
	
; where
 
xs; x
s


is the savers equilibrium allocation
in the absence of an indexed bond market. Then, rgs
0
(xs)+rg
s0
 
xs

in eqn
(3.36) and rgb
0  
xb

+rg
b0
 
xb

in eqn (3.37) can be expressed as Eg
0
(es1 + ey)
and Eg
0  
eb1   ey, respectively.
Proof. In the same way, we can dene ey+ = xs+   es1; xs+   es1; r; r	
where
 
xs+ ; x
s+


is the savers equilibrium allocation with the indexed bond mar-
kets. The point
 
xs+   es1; xs+   es1

is located in the area between the 45-degree
line and the feasible allocation line.
For the convenience of proof, we assume a iso-mean dotted line (ab) in Figure
3.6. If a random variable et is dened with variables (x   e1; x   e1) on the dotted
line and with probabilities r and r, then E
et = E [ey]. The variance of et is
strictly decreasing as the point (x   e1; x   e1) is moving from point a to point
b. Therefore, ey is a mean-preserving spread of et.
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Figure 3.6: Mean preserving lines
In the same way, we can dene the dotted line (ab) in quadrant III. Along
the line (ab), we can dene the random variable ey in the same way. The line ab
and ab are symmetrical to (0,0).
We need to show that for any ey+ in the region A or B, either that
Egs
0
(es1 + ey+) < Egs0 (es1 + ey) or that Egb0  eb1   ey+ < Egb0  eb1   ey is true.
Then, by eqns (3.36) and (3.37), we can nalize the proof that the nancial inno-
vation induces both qb and to qb (1 + n) increase.
Case 1 (ey 2 A): Since (gi)00 < 0, there is a et (< ey) on ab such that
Egs0 (es1 + ey+) < Egs0  es1 + et. We know that Egs0  es1 + et < Egs0 (es1 + ey) be-
cause (gi)000 > 0 and ey is a mean-preserving spread of et. Therefore, it is true that
Egs0 (es1 + ey+) < Egs0 (es1 + ey).
Case 2: (ey 2 B). By market clearing conditions, it is true that ( ey+) 2
B. Since (gi)00 < 0, there is a et (<  ey+) on ab such that Egb0  eb1   ey+ <
Egb0
 
eb1   et. We know that Egb0  eb1   et < Egb0  eb1   ey because (gi)000 > 0 and
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 ey is a mean-preserving spread of et. Therefore, it is true that Egb0  eb1   ey+ <
Egb0
 
eb1   ey.
By Cases 1 and 2, we know that either Egs0 (es1 + ey) or Egb0  eb1   ey decrease
by the introduction of indexed bonds; thus, qb decreases by eqns (3.36) and (3.37),
as well.
If a monetary policy is unstable, the real payo¤s of nominal securities is uncer-
tain. Therefore, the agents who trade nominal securities will face future income
risks and thus, have precautionary savings motives. These precautionary motives
cause the asset demand to increase while the asset supply decreases and eventu-
ally results in an increase in the equilibrium asset price. However, the introduction
of an indexed bond decreases the precautionary demand for nominal securities in
two ways. First, the indexed bond is a risk-safe asset which does not transfer any
income uncertainty. Second, it can be a substitute for a nominal bond for pre-
cautionary savings. Therefore, the introduction of an indexed bond drives down
the equilibrium price of the nominal security, and thus drives up the equilibrium
nominal interest rate.
In contrast, the e¤ect of risk aversion is clearly distinct from that of precaution-
ary saving. With the introduction of the indexed bonds, the e¤ects of risk aversion
provides both savers and borrowers with an incentive to decrease the trading vol-
ume of the risky asset which is a nominal security. (See Figure 3.7(a).) Therefore,
in terms of risk aversion e¤ects, both demand and supply simultaneously decrease
by the indexed bonds; thus, the equilibrium prices are barely a¤ected or completely
una¤ected. However, in terms of precautionary saving e¤ect, the introduction of an
indexed bond prompts agent to decrease their precautionary savings. (See Figure
3.7(b).) Consequently, both demand and supply of the nominal securities decrease,
87
1ex -a
1ex -b
b
a
p
p
°45
1ex -a
1ex -b
b
a
p
p
°45
Decreasing risk
Decreasing
precautionary savings
(a) (b)
Figure 3.7: Risk aversion and precautionary saving e¤ects
thus the equilibrium price (nominal interest rate) of the securities decreases (in-
creases). Proposition 7 and the following corollary show that the main cause of a
rise in the equilibrium interest rates after the introduction of an indexed bond is
a precautionary savings motive but not the e¤ect of risk aversion. The following
corollary clearly suggests that the risk aversion does not a¤ect the changes in asset
prices through nancial innovation.
Corollary 3.1 By the introduction of an indexed bond, the nominal interest rates
increase if (gi)
000
> 0; i 2 I:
are unchanged if (gi)
000
= 0; i 2 I:
decrease if (gi)
000
< 0; i 2 I:
Proof. For the case of (gi)000 < 0, we can prove it in the same way as Proposition
7. For the case of (gi)000 = 0, see Lemma 3 in Section 7.
Corollary 1 shows that if agents lack precautionary savings motives, there is
no change in equilibrium asset prices through nancial innovation. As mentioned
above, the risk aversion e¤ects are associated with the changes in asset trading
volume but not with those in equilibrium prices.
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3.6.2 Financial innovation and Welfare
It has been a controversial issue, starting from Harts (1972) seminal work, whether
nancial innovation improves welfare. Financial innovation typically has real ef-
fects on equilibrium allocations, and thus on welfare when markets are incomplete.
The welfare e¤ects of a new security can be decomposed into two distinct compo-
nents. One is a portfolio e¤ect, providing agents more portfolio choices and the
other is a price e¤ect, the change of existing asset prices. The rst e¤ect always has
a positive impact on welfare. Without any changes in equilibrium prices of existing
assets, the introduction of a new asset provides agents with a better opportunity
to distribute income across states. However, because of the price e¤ect, nancial
innovation does not guarantee Pareto improvement in the economy. When the in-
troduction of an indexed bond drives down the prices of nominal securities, savers
reap the benets from the lower interest rates while borrowers get lost. If the price
e¤ect is great enough compared to the portfolio e¤ect, the borrowers would even
be worse o¤ through nancial innovation. (See such an example in the Appendix.)
The following corollary addresses this issue.
Corollary 3.2 If (gi)
000
> 0 for all i 2 I, the introduction of an indexed bond
makes the saver (the agent who holds a positive amount of nominal securities)
better o¤ while the borrower (the agent who holds a negative amount of nominal
securities) can be better or worse o¤.
Proof. For the xed nominal interest rate, the introduction of an indexed bond
make agents better o¤ by the revealed preferences hypothesis. When the nominal
interest rate increases, i.e., the price of nominal securities decreases, the saver can
be better o¤. Therefore, it is trivial that the saver will be better o¤ through the
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introduction of indexed bonds. In contrast, the borrower is not necessarily made
better o¤ because of the negative impact of the price e¤ect.
Corollary 2 implies that the innovation on indexed bonds, in general, is more
benecial for savers than borrowers. Borrowers are even worse o¤ by the inno-
vation. Nevertheless, nancial innovations cannot make everyone worse o¤ unless
the equilibrium set is unique or nite.14 In other words, there is at least one agent
who is better o¤ by the introduction of a new asset.
3.6.3 Introduction of a nominal bond
It is also interesting to consider the situation where a nominal bond is introduced
in the economy where an indexed bond and money were previously available as
nancial instruments. In this case, the introduction of a nominal security triggers
the precautionary saving motives, which is the opposite situation to the case in
the previous section. Therefore, the price of an indexed bond increases by the
introduction of the nominal security, and equivalently the returns of the indexed
bonds decreases.
Proposition 3.8 If (gi)000 > 0 for all i 2 I, the introduction of a nominal bond in
an economy with money and an indexed bond make the returns of the indexed bond
decrease.
Proof. It can be proven in the same way as the proof of Proposition 7. In this
case, with the introduction of a new asset, agentsconsumption is more unbalanced
14If the economy has real indeterminacy, especially in GEI with nominal securities, nancial
innovations make all agents be worse o¤. See Cass and Citanna (1998) and Elul (1995).
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across states. By the innovation on a nominal bond, the excess demands, previously
located on the 45-degree line, now move to the area between the 45-degree line and
the feasible allocation line.
Several research papers have suggested that the introduction of a new asset,
in general, decreases the precautionary saving motives, and thus drives down the
asset prices. However, this paper shows that a new asset can even boost the
motives of precautionary saving. In this case, the nancial innovation drives down
the existing asset prices. The following two tables summarize the main results
in Section 6 when agents have quasi-linear utility function. For the numerical
examples for the three cases (g000 > 0; g000 = 0; g000 < 0), see the Appendix.
Table 3.3: The impact of nancial innovation on interest rates
nominal interest rate
after introduction
of an indexed bond
real interest rate
after introduction
of a nominal bond
g000> 0 up down
g000 = 0
(CAPM)
xed xed
g000 < 0 down up
3.7 Concluding remarks
The presence of proportional transaction costs in asset markets can a¤ect asset
market trading signicantly. This paper demonstrates that nominal security mar-
kets could completely shut down under the assumption of frictionless asset markets
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Table 3.4: Precautionary savings and welfare
welfare
after introduction
of indexed bonds
welfare
after introduction
of nominal bonds
g000 > 0
saver
borrower
better o¤
better or worse
better or worse
better o¤
g000 = 0
(CAMP )
saver
borrower
better o¤
better o¤
better o¤
better o¤
g000 < 0
saver
borrower
better or worse
better o¤
better o¤
better or worse
but are active if the transaction cost of the nominal bonds is lower than that of the
indexed bonds. These results provide theoretical explanations for several empiri-
cal ndings that the higher liquidity costs of TIPS compared to those of nominal
securities is associated with low trading volume of TIPS markets. This paper also
indicates that incorporating the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) in a gen-
eral equilibrium framework can be misleading in understanding the welfare e¤ect
of nancial innovation. The precautionary saving motives, which are ignored in
CAPM, can a¤ect equilibrium nominal interest rates signicantly when nancial
innovation occurs; the precautionary motives force the equilibrium nominal interest
rates to increase when an indexed bond is introduced to the economy. Therefore,
borrowers can be made even worse by the innovation on indexed bonds.
In this paper, real economic fundamental shocks are suppressed and the only
source of ination volatility is an unstable monetary policy. In general, the source
of ination uncertainty can be classied into non-economic fundamental shocks
(monetary shocks) and real fundamental shocks, which can be simply understood
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by Fishers famous equation: MV = PQ . The price level P is a¤ected by Q (real
GDP) andM (money supply). The issue is that ination volatility from real shocks
can be even benecial to the economy since the shocks induce real returns of
nominal securities to be positively correlated with economic-wide shocks. In short,
price-level volatility from real economic fundamentals can be interpreted as a result
of e¢ cient market allocations. This is a similar idea to relative price uctuations
from sector-specic shocks in complete markets, which help the economy achieve
Pareto-optimal allocations. The main concern of ination volatility for economists
is not the volatility which arises as a result of real shocks, but that from non-real
economic fundamentals such as monetary shocks or sunspots.
This paper assumes that the ination volatility is from an unstable monetary
policy. However, the volatility can be also from other types of non-economic fun-
damentals such as sunspots. The possibility of ination volatility triggered by
sunspots is shown in a general equilibrium model with incomplete markets (GEI)
in Cass (1989;1992).15 In the Cass GEI model, the monetary economy is dened by
pure inside money, the net supply of which is zero. In contrast, outsidemoney,
the quantity of which is determined by the central bank, is assumed in this model.
To incorporate the two types of non-real fundamental uncertainty into one model
is still a remaining question.
The model in this paper can be easily extended to a model with many consumers
and many states. The one di¢ culty in the extension is the question of how to dene
the measure of monetary instability if there are more than two states at date
1. Each equilibrium allocation corresponds to a unique level of relative standard
deviation of money supply uctuations in the two-state model. However, with
15Kang (2012b) investigated how the asset trading volumes and welfare can be a¤ected by the
introduction of indexed bonds when the economy has ination uncertainty triggered by sunspots.
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more than two states, the equilibrium allocation is not uniquely determined by the
relative standard deviation unless all consumers have mean-variance preferences.
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CHAPTER 4
NON-CONNECTEDNESS OF THE SET OF EQUILIBRIUM
MONEY PRICES IN THE STATIC ECONOMY: A
CONSTRUCTIVE EXAMPLE
4.1 Introduction
For the static general equilibrium model with lump-sum taxes and transfers de-
nominated in money, Balasko and Shell (1993) show that there is a continuum
of money prices for which a monetary equilibrium exists at each price of money.
They also suggest the possibility that the set of equilibrium money prices is not
connected, because some taxpayers become bankrupt as the price of money in-
creases in a certain range; however, as the price of money increases beyond that
range, consumers become free from bankruptcy. Peck (1987) constructs an exam-
ple of an economy with three consumers and two commodities in which the set
of equilibrium money prices is not connected. Based on Pecks example, Garratt
(1992) shows that this connectedness property can depend on the choice of the nu-
meraire. However, the examples of Peck (1987) and Garratt (1992) do not specify
the functional form of utility. This paper suggests three specic utility functions
for which such a paradoxical outcome can be derived. Using the concept of unre-
stricted equilibrium which allows negative consumption, closed form solutions for
equilibrium prices are derived.
The existence of such a non-connected set implies that some consumers can be
better o¤ by paying higher taxes, especially when their income is recovering from
bankruptcy. To understand this paradoxical result, it is necessary to distinguish
The modied version of this essay is forthcoming at Macroeconomic Dynamics.
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the direct e¤ect from the indirect (relative price) e¤ect of tax plans on consumers
income. The magnitude of the direct e¤ect depends on the price of money; as the
price of money goes up, the amount of taxes also go up. An increase in the money
price can also a¤ect the equilibrium relative price. The income change from the
relative price is the indirect e¤ect. For taxpayers, the direct e¤ect always decreases
their utility as the price of money increases, while the indirect e¤ect can increase
or decrease their utility. If the negative direct e¤ect is dominated by the positive
indirect e¤ect, bankrupt taxpayers can be free from bankruptcy and, consequently,
monetary equilibrium can be restored.
These paradoxical results are similar to the three-agents transfer paradox,
where tax-transfer plans make taxpayers better o¤ or recipients worse o¤.1 A spe-
cic example in a general equilibriummodel was rst suggested by Gale (1974), and
has been developed by Guesnerie and La¤ont (1978), Chichilnisky (1980), Leonard
and Manning (1983), Yano (1983), Jones (1984), and Kang and Ye (2012). Even
though taxes and transfers in the transfer paradox are denominated in commodi-
ties but not money, its main outcomes are almost the same as that of the economy
with nominal taxes and transfers. However, constructing an example for a non-
connected set of equilibrium money prices is more challenging than the transfer
paradox, because in the former case we must have bankruptcy occur in the inte-
rior of the set of money prices. On the other hand, in the case of the transfer
paradox, the tax-adjusted income change is not necessarily a convex or concave
function of taxes and the consumer does not need to be bankrupt. Therefore, if a
non-connected equilibrium money price set exists for an economy, we can always
construct the transfer paradox example for the same preferences and endowments.
1Yano (1983) distinguished the weak transfer paradox, where a donor becomes better o¤ or
a recipient becomes worse o¤, from the strong transfer paradox, where the welfare of both the
donor and the recipient changes in the paradoxical direction. Based on his denition, our example
is classied as the weak transfer paradox, where donors (taxpayers) can be better o¤.
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The reverse is not true, however.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic
setting of the economy of this paper. Section 3 introduces a constructive example.
The paradoxical results of the example are shown in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
4.2 Economy
Balasko and Shell (1993) and Peck (1987) indicate that we must have at least two
commodities and at least three consumers to get the paradoxical outcomes. Let the
number of commodities be two and the number of consumers be three. The vector
of commodity prices given by p = (p1; p2) has commodity one as numeraire, so
p1 = 1. We denote xh = (x1h; x
2
h) 2 R2+ for the consumption plan for consumer h 2
H where H = f1; 2; 3g. Let !h = (!1h; !2h) 2 R2+ for the commodity endowments
for consumer h.2 Next, the scal policy is dened by the vector  = ( 1;  2;  3).
The scal policy is balanced, i.e.,
P
h2H
h = 0. The price of money in terms of
commodity 1 is pm  0. Let uh consumer hs preferences dened on

0;
P
h2H
!1h


0;
P
h2H
!2h

where
P
h2H
!1h and
P
h2H
!2h are aggregate endowments of commodities 1
and 2, respectively.
A competitive equilibrium of the economy E (u; !; ) is a pair of actions and
prices (x; q) where x = (x1; x2; x3) and q = (p; pm), such that
(i) for h 2 H;
xh = argmax
x1h;x
2
h
uh
 
x1h; x
2
h

(4.1)
2In Balasko and Shell (1993), the space of endowment is dened as R2++ instead of R2+:
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s:t x1h + p
2x2h  !1h + p2!2h   pmh (4.2)
and xh 2 R2+;
and
(ii) (commodity market clearing conditions)
P
h2H
x1h =
P
h2H
!1h and
P
h2H
x2h =
P
h2H
!2h: (4.3)
4.3 Example
Let endowments be
!1 =
 
!11; !
2
1

=

0;
1
2

(4.4)
!2 =
 
!12; !
2
2

=

4
5
;
1
2

(4.5)
!3 =
 
!13; !
2
3

=

1
5
; 0

(4.6)
and let the tax-transfer policy be given by
 = ( 1;  2;  3) =

2
5
;
3
5
; 1

:
The tax policy is balanced, i.e.,  1+ 2+ 3 = 0. Consumers 1 and 2 are taxpayers,
while consumer 3 is a recipient.
The preferences of the three consumers are given by
u1
 
x11; x
2
1

= min
 
x11; x
2
1

(4.7)
u2
 
x12; x
2
2

= min
 
x12; x
2
2

(4.8)
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and
u3
 
x13; x
2
3

=  (1  x
1
3)
2
2
+
1
10
log x23 (4.9)
This paper chooses the two taxpayersutilities as Leontief preferences for three
reasons. First, the choice is simply for computational convenience. With these
Leontief utilities, we get the following two equations, x11 = x
2
1 and x
1
2 = x
2
2, which
are necessary to get closed form solutions. Second, the Leontief utilities are limit-
ing cases of the CES utilities. Therefore, if a non-connectednessexample exists
for Leontief utilities, such an example also exists for smooth CES utilities by the
continuity property. Smoothness of utilities is one of the regularity assumptions
that is also assumed in Balasko and Shell (1983). Finally, Leontief utilities are also
well-dened for negative values of consumption. Therefore, as allowing negative
consumption, we can derive a set of unrestricted equilibria. In contrast to a com-
petitive equilibrium which is only dened on the positive orthant, an unrestricted
equilibrium is dened on both the negative and positive orthant. The set of unre-
stricted equilibria includes that of competitive equilibria. The former has a proper
interval, but the latter is a non-connected set in this economy.
Because the two taxpayers have Leontief preferences, the commodity price, p2;
is determined by the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) of the recipients utility.
If the equilibrium commodity price, p2; is a convex functionof equilibriummoney
price, pm; and the functionhas a minimum value for some value of pm, it may
be possible that consumer 1s income is also convex in pm because consumer 1 is
endowed with more of the second good, i.e., !1h << !
2
h from equation (4.4). In this
case, as pm is increasing from zero, p2 is decreasing. Thus, the taxpayersincome
from endowment is decreasing and he eventually becomes bankrupt. However, as
pm increases further, p2 actually increases and the taxpayer becomes free from
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bankruptcy.3 To design such a case, where p2 is a convex functionof pm, the
MRS of the recipient (consumer 3) should be convex in his income. As consumer
3s income is increasing, his consumption will be increasing also. Because the two
other consumers have Leontief preferences, consumer 3 always consumes an equal
amount of the two goods in equilibrium. Therefore, we need to check the MRS of
the preference at the equal consumption plan, i.e., x13 = x
2
3 2 (0; 1]. Based on these
ideas, we propose the following equation for the MRS of the recipients utility at
the equal consumption:
MRS(x13;x23)
=
@u3(y; y)=@x
1
3
@u3(y; y)=@x23
= ay (1  y) where a > 0: (4.10)
= 1=p2
where y = x13 = x
2
3. The MRS is concave in consumption and has a maximum
value at y = 1=2. Choosing a = 10, the utility function in equation (4.9) satises
equation (4.10). In addition, the utility function is strictly increasing and strictly
concave in (0; 1]2. Figure 4.1 shows the indi¤erence curves of consumer 3s utility
function and their tangent lines at the 45 degree line in which the slopes of tangent
lines are equal to 1=p2 (MRS).
4.4 Result
Because consumer 1s and consumer 2s optimal consumption satises the equations
x12 = x
2
2 and x
1
3 = x
2
3, by the commodity market clearing conditions, we get the
following equation:
x13 = x
2
3 (4.11)
3We can nd the opposite situation where the taxpayer is endowed with more of the rst
good, and the relative price p2 is a concave function of the price of money.
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Figure 4.1: Consumer 3s indi¤erence curves
From the rst order conditions of consumer 3s maximization problem, we get:
1
10x23 (1  x13)
= p2: (4.12)
The budget constraint of consumer 3 is that
x13 + p
2x23 =
1
5
+ pm: (4.13)
From equations (4.11-4.13), we derive equilibrium relative price p2 as a correspond-
ing function of pm. That is,
p2 (pm) =
1  15pm + 25 (pm)2 + (5pm + 1)
q
25 (pm)2   40pm + 26
50pm + 5
; (4.14)
where both p2 and pm are endogenous. For any nonnegative pm, there is a unique
unrestricted equilibrium, so pm is indexing the unrestricted equilibrium and p2 (pm)
is the corresponding function indicating the value of p2.
p2 (pm) is strictly convex and has a minimum value at pm = 1=2, which is shown
in Figure B.1. From equation (4.14), each consumer hs income !1h + p
2!2h   pmh
can be derived as a function of pm. Figure B.2 shows consumer 1s and consumer
2s income, given each equilibrium money price. For values of the money price
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Figure 4.2: A relative price and money price
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Figure 4.3: Consumersincome and money price
in the interval [0; 0:5), two consumersincomes are strictly positive and, thus, the
monetary equilibrium is dened. However, for pm 2 [0:5; 3:28], consumer 1 is
bankrupt and no monetary equilibrium is dened. For pm 2 (3:28; 4:64), consumer
1 becomes solvent again. If the money price is higher than 4:64, consumer 2
becomes bankrupt. Therefore, the set of equilibrium money prices is dened as
the union of two disconnected sets: [0; 0:5) [ (3:28; 4:64).
The paradoxical outcome that consumer 1 can be better o¤despite paying more
taxes occurs for money prices in the interval (3:28; 4:64). Consumer 1s utility can
increase with the price of money only if the direct (tax) e¤ect is dominated by the
indirect (relative price) e¤ect. This counterintuitive result is similar to that of the
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Figure 4.4: Consumption and money price
transfer paradox in the economy with taxes and transfers denominated with a
commodity. The transfer paradox occurs when a donor (taxpayer) is better o¤ or
a recipient is worse o¤, or both. With the same preferences and endowments but
with commodity 1 taxes instead of money taxes, we can derive the same graphs in
Figures B.1-4.4 by replacing the X-axis with the commodity-1 tax.
In Figure 4.4, the consumption of the three consumers is plotted allowing for
negative consumption. The set of money prices that guarantees positive consump-
tion is the same as that with positive incomes.
4.5 Conclusion
This paper presents a constructive example where a set of equilibrium money prices
is not connected using two Leontief utilities and one smooth utility. To facilitate
the analysis of how the bankrupted taxpayer can be recovered by the change of
money prices, this paper introduces a unrestricted equilibrium that allows negative
tax-adjusted income. The choice of Leontief functions for the two taxpayersutility
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makes it possible to dene the unrestricted equilibria.4 This paper demonstrates
that the change in relative price, which is driven by the MRS of the smooth utility,
leads to the paradoxical result that taxpayers can be better o¤ by paying higher
taxes. Another contribution of this paper is to show that the three-agents transfer
paradox, rst proposed by Gale (1974), is similar to the non-connectedness exam-
ple: higher taxes can be benecial for some agents if the positive indirect e¤ect
from relative commodity prices dominates the negative the tax e¤ect.
4In general, the negative values in utility function are not even mathematically-dened, es-
pecially with a smooth CES utility. The one exception is when the CES utilitys elasticity of
substitution is 1/2.
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APPENDIX A
CHAPTER 1 OF APPENDIX
There are two consumers with endowments of (1; 0) and (0; 1); respectively.
Their expected utility functions are the same as log(x0) + log(x1). State prob-
abilities are  =  = 0:5. Figure A.1(a) shows a continuum of equilibrium
allocations in the space of excess demand of x1 and x1 where 0    0:6.1
The lenders (mh > 0) allocations are located in the northeast area while the bor-
rowers (mh < 0) allocations are in the southwest area. In Figure A.1(b), the two
consumersutility levels are plotted with price-level volatility . In this example,
the borrowers utility level is higher with higher price volatility while the lenders
is the opposite. In Figure A.2, the solid lines represent a continuum of equilibrium
allocations and utility levels without any tax plan while the dashed line represents
those with the proposed tax plans, as described in eqn (1.12). Figure A.2b clearly
shows that the welfare is improving from higher price volatility to lower volatility
with the proposed tax plans.
1The gure should be three-dimensional including the excess demand of x0; but the three-
dimensional gure is projected onto a two-dimensional space.
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Figure A.1: A continuum of equilibrium allocations
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Figure A.2: The proposed tax-transfer plans
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APPENDIX B
CHAPTER 2 OF APPENDIX
B.1 Proof of Proposition 5
Lemma B.1 xB is increasing but x
B
 is decreasing in P > 1. (Subscript "B"
represents the asset buyer.)
Proof. There are four cases:
Case 1 : both xi and x
i
 increase in P > 1:
Case 2 : xi increases but x
i
 decreases in P > 1:()
Case 3 : xi decreases but x
i
 increases in P > 1:
Case 4 : both xi and x
i
 decrease in P > 1:
First, Case 3 is ruled out since xi=x
i
 must increase in P > 1. Then, we need
to show that Case 1 and 4 are not true.
Assuming that Case 1 is true: for 1 < P < P 0 ; xB (P) < xB (P 0) and xB (P) <
xB (P 0). By market clearing conditions, we get: x1S (P) > x1S (P 0) and x1S (P) >
x1S (P 0).
Choosing q0 = 1, the price of a risky asset is given by
q+ =
Rg
S0 (x1S ) + Rg
S0

x1S

fS0 (xS0 )
=
Rg
B0  xB + RgB0  xB 
fB0 (xB0 )
: (B.1)
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By xB (P) < xB (P 0),xB (P) < xB (P 0) and strictly concavity of gh,
Rg
S0 (x1S ) + Rg
S0

x1S

decreases in P. In the same way, RgB0
 
xB

+
Rg
B0  xB  increases in P. Therefore, by eqn (B.1), the market clearing condi-
tion, xS0 + x
B
0 = e
S
0 + e
B
0 and strict concavity of f
i; the following inequalities must
be satised
xB0 (P) < xB0 (P 0) and xS0 (P) > xS0 (P 0):
The asset buyers budget constraints are
xB0 (P) + q+(P)BB(P) = 0 and
xB0 (P 0) + q(P 0)BB(P 0) = 0
Since xB0 (P) < xB0 (P 0) and BB(P) < BB(P 0),
q+(P) > q+(P 0) (B.2)
The asset sellers budget constraints are
xS0 (P) + q+(P)BS(P) = 0 and
xS0 (P 0) + q+(P 0)BS(P 0) = 0
Since xS0 (P) > xS0 (P 0) and BS(P) > BS(P 0),
q+(P) < q+(P 0) (B.3)
Inequalities (B.2) and (B.3) contradict each other.
We can show that Case 4 is not true in the same way.
pFh
q+
is
pFh
q+
=
g
i0 (xi) + g
i0  xi
Rgi0 (xi) + Rgi0
 
xi
 :
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We need to show that d
dP

pBF
q+

> 0 and d
dP

pSF
q+

< 0. There are four vari-
ables R (P) ; R (P) ; xi (P) and xi (P) which should be considered in the total
derivative. The total derivative can be divided into two parts:
d
dP

pBF
q+

=
d
dP
 
g
B0  xB + gB0  xB 
RgB0 (xB ) + RgB0
 
xB
!
xi;x
i
=constant
+
d
dP
 
g
B0  xB + gB0  xB 
RgB0 (xB ) + RgB0
 
xB
!
R;R=constant
:
Since gi is strictly concave and xB > x
B
 for the asset buyer, g
B0  xB  < gB0  xB .
Since R (P) and R (P) increases and decreases in P, respectively, and
R (P) + R (P) is constant in P,
d
dP
 
Rg
B0  xB + RgB0  xB R;R=constant < 0:
Therefore, the rst term is strictly positive.
The second term can be expressed as
T (G) =
 + G
R + RG
where G =
gB0
 
xB

gB0 (xB )
T (G) is increasing in G since  > R. dTdP is positive since
dxB
dP > 0;
dxB
dP < 0
(by lemma) and strictly concavity of g0. Thus, the second term also increases in
P and d
dP

pBF
q+

> 0.
We can prove that d
dP

pSF
q+

< 0 in the same way. Finally,
d
dP

pBF   pSF
pSF

=
d
dP

pBF
pSF

=
d
dP

pBF
q+

=
d
dP

pSF
q+

> 0.
End of Proof.
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B.2 Proof of Proposition 6
The budget sets in a pure monetary economy is dened as
Bi+ (q) =
 
zi; Bi
 jzi + qBi  0	 :
The budget sets in a combined economy is denes as
Bi
 
q; p;  i

=
 
zi; Bi; ni
 jzi + qBi + pmax(ni; 0) + p (1 + )min(ni; 0)   i	 :
We need to show that for any equilibrium of the money market
 
zi+; B
i
+

, there
exists a lump-sum transfer plan
P
i2I 
i = 0 such that
 
zi+; B
i
+; 0
 2 Bi (q; p;  i)
for all i 2 I and any q (since we do not know about the equilibrium price q after
a tax plan, we need to prove it for any price q 2 R++). Then, the allocation 
zi+; B
i
+; 0
I
i=1
is also a¤ordable in the combined market. That means that the
combined market is at least weakly Pareto superior to the money market by the
revealed preferences hypothesis.
Assuming that the equilibrium price and allocations in the monetary market
are q+ and (zi+; B
i
+)
I
i=1, the following equation is satised
zi+ + q+B
i
+ = 0 for all i = 1; :::; I (B.4)
In the combined market, we need to show the existence of  i for i = 1; ::; I such
that
P
i 
i = 0 and
 
zi+; B
i
+; 0
 2 Bi (q; p;  i) for any q. Then,
zi+ + qB
i
+ = 
i for all i = 1; :::; I (B.5)
subtracting eqn (B.5) with (B.4), we get
(q   q+)Bi+ =  i
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That means that if  i = (q   q+)Bi+, (zi+; Bi+; 0) 2 Bi+ (q; p;  i). Also, we can
prove that
P
i 
i = 0 by market clearing:
P
i
 i =
P
i
(q   q+)Bi+ = (q   q+)
P
i
Bi+ = 0:
End of Proof.
B.3 Example
There are two consumers B and S with endowments of (10; 0) and (0; 10); respec-
tively. Their expected utility functions are the same as log(x0) + log(x1). State
probabilities are  =  = 0:5. Assuming that the ination level P = 2, the cor-
responding price-level (ination) volatility is R = 33:3% by eqn (2.4). In this case,
it is computed that  = 23% by eqn (2.7). Assuming that the transaction cost is
10% ( = 0:1) in the combined market, the equilibrium outcomes are summarized
in the table.
Table B.1: Monetary and combined markets
Monetary Market Combined Market
Buyer Seller Buyer Seller
Utility Level 3:07 3:26 3:19 3:18
money(mi) 0:5  0:5 0:212  0:212
bond(ni) - 0:276  0:276
(p; p) (0:820; 1:640) (0:744; 1:488)
(p; p+ ) - (0:948; 1:048)
q 1:093 0:992
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Figure B.1: Ination line and asset trading
The equilibrium prices in the monetary market are higher than those in the
combined market. Higher price levels imply a higher value of money in period 0.
As explained in section 5, the higher value of money is from the asset buyers higher
demand for money. In a combined market, the demand for money is lower because
of the substitution e¤ects from the introduction of indexed bonds. Consequently,
the value of money is not as high as that in a pure monetary market. The change
of money value after the introduction of indexed bonds causes the asset sellers
utility to decrease from 3:26 to 3:18. (See the table.)
Figure B.1 represents the equilibrium allocations in the space of excess de-
mand. The gure should be three dimensional including the excess demand of x0
but we can imagine the original three-dimensional gure is projected onto a two-
dimensional one. The buyers allocation is located in the northeast quadrant while
the sellers is in the southwest quadrant. The allocations are symmetric to (0,0)
by market clearing conditions. "+" and "o" represent the equilibrium allocations
in pure monetary and combined markets, respectively. From the gure, we know
that the equilibrium allocations move closer to the 45 degree line in the combined
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market although both markets have the same volatility level.
Figure B.2 shows how two consumers utility change in transaction costs. Sur-
prisingly, the asset sellers utility is increasing in transaction cost  if  > 10%.
Higher transaction costs make the demand for money increase by the substitution
e¤ects. Therefore, the price of money goes up and consequently, the asset buyer
has more income from selling the money (risky asset) at a higher price. If the
transaction cost is higher than 23%, the indexed bond market is inactive. In that
case, the equilibrium allocations in a combined economy
 E ; R; 
C
are identical
to those in a pure monetary economy
 E ; R
M
.
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APPENDIX C
CHAPTER 3 OF APPENDIX
C.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that M < M. Then, the state 
is inationary while the state  is deationary, i.e., p < p. Lets dene P as the
ratio between p and p: P = p=p. P is strictly increasing in RM . There are
four possible changes in consumption at date 1 as P is increasing.
There are four cases:
Case 1 : both xs and x
s
 increase in P > 1:
Case 2 : xs increases but x
s
 decreases in P > 1:()
Case 3 : xs decreases but x
s
 increases in P > 1:
Case 4 : both xs and x
s
 decrease in P > 1:
First, Case 3 is ruled out since xs=x
s
 must increase in P > 1. Then, we need
to show that Cases 1 and 4 are not true.
Assuming that Case 1 is true: for 1 < P < P 0; xs(P) < xs(P 0) and xs(P) <
xs(P 0). By market clearing conditions, we get: xb(P) > xb(P 0) and xb(P) >
xb(P 0).
The selling and buying prices of the (equivalent) nominal security is given by
q+b =
rg
b0
 
xb

+ rg
b0
 
xb

f s0 (xs0)
(C.1)
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q+b (1 + n) =
rg
s0 (xs) + rg
s0
 
xs

f s0
 
xb0
 : (C.2)
By xs(P) < xs(P 0), xs(P) < xs(P 0) and strict concavity of gi, rgb0
 
xb

+
rg
b0
 
xb

decreases in P. In the same way, rgs0 (xs)+rgs0
 
xs

increases
in P. Therefore, by eqns (C.1) and (C.2), the market clearing condition, xs0+xb0 =
es0 + e
b
0 and strict concavity of f
i; the following inequalities must be satised
xs0(P) < xs0(P 0)andxb0(P) > xb0(P 0):
The savers budget constraints, where an indexed bond is inactive, are
xs0(P) + q+(P) (1 + n) bs(P) = 0 and
xs0(P 0) + q+(P
0
) (1 + n) b
s(P 0) = 0
Since xs0(P) < xs0(P 0) and bb(P) < bb(P 0),
q+(P) > q+(P 0) (C.3)
The borrowers budget constraints are
xb0(P) + q+(P)bb(P) = 0 and
xb0(P
0
) + q+(P 0)bb(P 0) = 0
Since xb0(P) > xb0(P 0) and bb(P) > bb(P 0),
q+(P) < q+(P 0) (C.4)
Inequalities (C.3) and (C.4) contradict each other.
We can show that Case 4 is not true in the same way.
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C.2 Quasi-linear quadratic preferences
C.2.1 Asset prices
Agent is utility is given by
ui
 
xi

= i0x
i
0  
1
2
E
 
i   exis2 ; i = 1; ::::; I (C.5)
where exis = xi; xi; ; 	 :
The mean and variance of the random variable exis is mi and i2. Then, eqn
(C.5) can be expressed as
ui
 
xi

= i0x
i
0 + 
imi +
1
2
mi2   1
2
i2   i2; i = 1; :::; I
mi and i2 is given by
mi = ei1 + b
i + zid (C.6)
i2 = var
 
ei1 + b
ier + zid = z2ner: (C.7)
where er = fr; r; ; g which is the same as  1M
M
+

M
;
1
M

M
+

M
; ; 

. Given
a monetary policy M , er is computed as
er =
p


M
M
  1


M
M
+ 
 1 where M > M: (C.8)
From eqn (C.8), we know that as a monetary policy is more unstable, i.e., M
M
is increasing, er is increasing. Therefore, both er and  are increasing in MM .
Then, utility can be expressed as
ui
 
xi

= i0x
i
0 +
 
i   ei1
  
bi + zid

+
1
2
 
bi + zid
2   1
2
bi2er
+constant.
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By the rst order conditions, we can get the following equations:
iqb =
 
i   ei1

+
 
bi + zid
  bier if i = b (C.9)
iqb (1 + n) =
 
i   ei1

+
 
bi + zid
  bier if i = s (C.10)
iqd =
 
i   ei1

+
 
bi + zid

if i = b (C.11)
iqd (1 + d) =
 
i   ei1

+
 
bi + zid

if i = s (C.12)
where where i is the marginal utility of income for agent i, i.e., i = i0=p0.
By the asset market clearing conditions
P
i2I
bi = 0 and
P
i2I
zid = 0; and eqns
(C.9)-(C.12), the prices of qb and qd can be derived as
qb =
p0
P
i2I
(i   ei1)
b0 + (1 + n)
s
0
(C.13)
and
qd =
p0
P
i2I
(i   ei1)
b0 + (1 + d)
s
0
: (C.14)
From eqns (C.13) and (C.14), we know that qb > qd and (1 + b) qb < (1 + d) qd
if and only if n < d.
C.2.2 Trading volume
The equivalent maximization for savers is given as
ui
 
xi

= i0x
i
0 +
 
i   ei1

(zn + zd) +
1
2
(zn + zd)
2   1
2
z2ner
+constant
subject to
p0x
i
0 + qbb
i + qdz
i
d = p0e0:
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First order conditions of the borrower are given as:
b0 = 
bp0
 
b = b0=p0

; (C.15) 
b   eb1

+
 
bb + zbd

= bqd; (C.16)
and  
b   eb1

+
 
bb + zbd
  bber = bqb (C.17)
From eqns (C.15), (C.16) and (C.17), zbn and z
b
d can be derived as a function of
(qn; qd; er), where the superscript b represents a borrower:
bb =
b0 (qb   qn)
p02er (C.18)
zbd = 
bqd  
 
b   eb1
  zn (C.19)
=
b0
p0
qd  
 
b   eb1
  b0 (qb   qn)
p02er
By the asset market clearing conditions, bs and zsd can be derived as:
bs =
b0 (qb   qd)
p02er (C.20)
zsd =  
b0
p0
qd +
 
b   eb1

+
b0 (qb   qd)
p02er (C.21)
The necessary condition for the indexed bond being active is that n < d, which
implies that qb > qd by eqns (C.13) and (C.14). From eqns (C.20) and (C.21), we
know that qbbs (= qbbs, the trading volume of the nominal bond) is decreasing in
2er while qdzsd (the trading volume of the indexed bond) is increasing.
C.3 Numerical Example
C.3.1 Log-linear preferences
Preferences, endowment and transaction costs in the example are given as
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Figure C.1: Unstable monetary policy and asset trading
v1 (x0; x1) = v
2 (x0; x1) = lnx0 + lnx1
e1 = (10; 0); e2 = (0; 10)
n = 5%:
 =  = 0:5
where there are two agents in the economy. The numerical examples in this paper
have no connection to empirical data. The Y-axis in Figure B.4 represents the
trading volumes of nominal and indexed bonds for the given transaction costs of
an indexed bond. Where the value of d is smaller than 5%, the indexed bond
market is inactive. In region 1, the trading volumes of the nominal bond are
monotonically increasing in d while the trading volume of indexed bonds are
monotonically decreasing in d. Figure C.1 also shows that as the economy has
more unstable monetary policy, the trading volume of the nominal security is
decreasing while that of the indexed security is increasing.
Figure C.2 shows that the savers and borrowers utility changes as the transac-
tion costs of the indexed bond is increasing (or decreasing) where ination volatility
is given as 33.3%. There are three regions in Figure C.2. (See also Figure 1.) In re-
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Figure C.2: Financial innovation and welfare
gion 1, both nominal and indexed bond markets are active. In region 2, the indexed
bond market is inactive. In Figure C.2 the borrowers utility is not increasing as
the transaction costs of indexed bonds are decreasing. Section 6 indicates that this
paradoxical result is due to the motives for precautionary savings. The introduc-
tion of indexed bonds can be interpreted that the economy is moving from region 2
to region 1. From Figure C.2, we know that the introduction of the indexed bonds
can make the borrower even worse o¤.
C.3.2 Quasi-linear preferences
Section 6 discusses the impact of nancial innovation on the nominal interest rates
and welfare based on quasi-linear preferences. I suggest two numerical examples to
show how precautionary savings motives a¤ect the nominal interest rate through
nancial innovation on an indexed bond. Once again, the numerical examples in
this paper have no connection to empirical data.
In the rst economy, agents have positive precautionary saving e¤ects, i.e.,
120
v222 > 0. The preferences are given by
vs = x0 + lnx1
vb = x0 + lnx1 + 8
where I = fs; bg.
In the second economy, agents have negative precautionary saving e¤ects, i.e.,
v222 > 0. The preferences are given by
vs = 15x0 + 36x1   13x31
vb = 15x0 + 36x1   13x31 + 40
The endowments of the two economies are the same as es = (10; 0) and
eb = (0; 10). In both economics, the monetary policy is given as (M0;M;M) =
(1; 2=3; 4=3) where  =  = 0:5.
Figure C.3(a) and C.3(b) shows the numerical simulation of the relationship
between the equilibrium nominal interest rates and the indexed bonds transaction
costs. Figure C.3 shows that the nancial innovation on the indexed bond a¤ects
the nominal interest rate in totally opposite directions in the two economies having
positive and negative precautionary motives, respectively. The innovation makes
the saver better o¤ while the borrower worse o¤ in the economy having positive
precautionary motives but vise versa in the other economy, which is shown in
Figure C.4.
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